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Protecting Environmental Values in Water Resources in Australia1 
 
Abstract.  After providing a broad biophysical, constitutional, historical 
and policy context, this paper examines recent initiatives in the eastern 
mainland States of Australia relating to water resource planning.  It 
focuses on issues of water sharing, particularly sharing water between 
consumptive users and the environment, while emphasising that this issue 
cannot be dealt with in isolation from broader questions of river health and 
catchment management.  In the context of water sharing, it examines 
provisions in the legislation addressing issues relating to institutional 
structures for water resource planning, scientific uncertainty (the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management), prioritisation between 
public and private values, and compensation. 
 
The Australian Context 
Low or temporally variable rainfall in many areas combined with high rates of 
evaporation, have led to a significant focus within Australia on measures to harvest 
available water supplies.  Large dams built in all states with the exception of South 
Australia are the primary source of water for domestic purposes and irrigation.2  Most 
run-off occurs after large rainfall events, and as a result, only 32% of the total run-off can 
feasibly be pumped from rivers or stored in dams. Much of this water comprises 
baseflows and low to moderate river flows that are very important for river health.3 
 
Most water resources development has taken place in the south east of Australia, 
and many river systems in the Murray-Darling Basin and along the east coast of Australia 
are either overdeveloped or approach full development status. Water use has increased 
dramatically over the last 15 years.  Overall, there was a 65% increase in water use 
between 1985 and 1996-7 (from 14,600GL to 24,060GL).  Surface waters represent 79% 
of water extracted and groundwaters 21%.4 
 
Irrigated agriculture (broadacre crops such as cotton, sugarcane, oilseeds and rice; 
vineyards and orchards; and horticulture) accounts for about 75% of water use in 
Australia.  In 1988-89, half of this comprised irrigated pasture, with most of this in NSW 
and Victoria.  But in terms of the value of irrigated production (4.6 billion in 1988-89), 
                                               
1 The primary focus is on the eastern States of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and 
Victoria, all of which have areas in the Murray-Darling Basin 
2 Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Group Chairs, Intersectoral Issues Report (1992), 111; 
Industry Commission, Report No 26, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal (1992), 22. 
3 Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister 




irrigated pasture accounted for only 20%.  Surface irrigation (eg, flood and furrow) is the 
usual method of application, but there is growing use of pressurised systems (eg, spray, 
micro-spray and drip), primarily for horticultural production.5 In 1996-97, Australians 
extracted 17,940GL from surface waters for irrigation, as compared with 10,200GL in 
1985, an increase of 76%.6 
 
 
The Murray-Darling Basin 
 
The Murray-Darling Basin is Australia’s largest river system, comprising 14% of 
the total area of the country.7  It extends over one million square kilometres of land in 
south eastern Australia, from the southern part of the state of Queensland in the north, 
through the state of New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
and the state of Victoria, to the mouth of the Murray river in the state of South Australia 
(SA). The Basin includes most of the countries best farmland. In 1997, 1.472 million 
hectares of land was irrigated in the Basin, 71% of the total area irrigated in Australia.8 
Around 75% of total surface water use in Australia occurs in the Basin, and it is estimated 
that 85% of the available surface water supply is used.9  Of water extracted between 
1988/89 and 1992/93, over 95% was for irrigation.  The Basin provides just over 41% of 
the gross value of Australia’s agriculture production.10 The value of agricultural 
production is in excess of $10 billion, and irrigation accounts for $3 billion of this.11 
 
An audit of water use in the Basin showed that between 1988 and 1994, water 
diversions grew by about 8%.  The greatest increases were in northern NSW and 
Queensland because of the high returns available from irrigated cotton.  The increase in 
Queensland was 89.3%, but from a small base.  In NSW, these increases were not fuelled 
by the grant of new water allocations for consumptive uses (cf Queensland where new 
licences have been granted) but by operating within the flexibilities of the allocation 
system existing at that time, discussed below.12 
 
                                               
5 Industry Commission, Report No 26, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal (1992), 193-194. 
6 Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister 
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings.  Available at 
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html 
7 Murray-Darling Basin Commission, “Basin Statistics,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au 
8 Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister 
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings.  Available at 
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html 
9 Industry Commission, Water Resources and Waste Water Disposal, Report No 26 (1992), 22. 
10 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Integrated Catchment Management in the Murray-Darling 
Basin 2001-2010: Delivering a Sustainable Future (June 2001), 1. 
11 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, An Audit of Water Use in the Murray-Darling Basin (1995), 
2. 
12 Ibid, 6, 9-10. 
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The Basin faces formidable environmental problems, resulting from poor land and 
water management.13 
 
o dryland salinity stemming from rising water tables caused by land clearing; 
 
o loss of biological diversity, with 20 mammals already extinct and at least 35 
birds and 16 mammals endangered;14 
 
o water quality problems caused by diffuse run-off (fertilisers and pesticides) 
from agricultural operations, and saline water discharges from both irrigation 
areas and dryland sources, as well as the impact of urban communities; 
 
o degradation of instream values, in particular damage to ecosystems, resulting 
from river regulation and water extraction for consumptive uses that reduces 
the frequency of high flows, shifts flows from spring to summer and autumn, 
when irrigation water is needed, and changes flow variability; 
 
o changes in river flow characteristics resulting, on the one hand, in permanent 
inundation of some floodplain wetlands and, on the other, reductions in the 
flooding of others in spring, impacting on fish and bird breeding;15 
 
o loss of up to 50% of the freshwater/inland wetlands since European 
settlement,16 with consequent loss of ecosystem services, such as nutrient 
cycling, flood mitigation, water filtration and sediment trapping; 
 
o reductions in river flow, contributing to conditions for the growth of blue-
green algal blooms, with 115 occurrences in NSW in the drought year of 
1993-94, 54 of which were serious;17 
 
o irrigation salinity, caused by rising water tables and waterlogging of typically 
saline sediments. 
 
Some of these problems, such as blue-green algae and salinity, pose immediate 
and transparent threats to human self-interest in terms of health impacts and loss of 
productivity, while in the case of others - loss of ecosystem services and reductions in 
                                               
13 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Natural Resources Management Strategy (1990); Murray-
Darling Basin Ministerial Council, An Audit of Water Use in the Murray-Darling Basin (1995); P Knights, 
B Fitzgerald and R Denham, “Environmental Flow Policy Development in NSW,”  Proceedings of the 
National Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (1995), 252-261. 
14 Murray-Darling Basin Commission, “Basin Statistics,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au 
15 NSW Environment Protection Authority, State of the Environment 1995 (1995), 43-44. 
16 Ibid, 43. 
17 Ibid, 49. 
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biodiversity - the threats posed are long-term and cumulative, and, consequently, less real 
to those whose behaviour contributes to their existence. 
 
 
Constitutional Division of Power Relating to Natural Resource Management 
 
The general position under the Australian Constitution is that the Commonwealth 
Parliament has powers to legislate only in specifically designated areas, primarily found 
in section 51, with the residue left to the States.  Even within these areas, Commonwealth 
power is not plenary, but shared with the States.  However, if State legislation in these 
areas is inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation, the latter prevails.18 
 
While the Commonwealth Parliament has no direct power to legislate on natural 
resource and environmental management issues, in recent years the High Court of 
Australia has interpreted the Commonwealth’s enumerated powers in section 51 of the 
Constitution expansively.19  This is particularly true of the external affairs power,20 under 
which legislation can be enacted to implement international environmental conventions to 
which Australia is a party, the corporations power,21 covering the environmental 
operations of foreign, financial and trading corporations, at least where they involve their 
trading activities, and the trade and commerce power.22 
 
So far as water management issues are concerned, however, additional constraints 
are placed on the Commonwealth by section 100 of the Australian Constitution, which 
provides: 
 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or 
commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the 
reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation. 
 
The full implications of this provision have not been explored.  Crawford points out that 
its effect was to qualify the federal power over river navigation by giving a qualified right 
to the States relating to the use of water in rivers, and that “conservation” was treated by 
many of the delegates to the Constitutional Conventions in the late 19th century as 
equivalent to “storage for use”.23  On one view its effect is limited to the use of waters in 
                                               
18 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 109. 
19 Murphyores v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625; 
Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 77 ALR 237; Queensland v Commonwealth (1989) 86 ALR 
519; NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 138 ALR 129. 
20 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 51(xxix). 
21 Ibid, s 51(xx). 
22 Ibid, s 51(i). 
23 J Crawford, “The Constitution” in T Bonyhady, Environmental Protection and Legal Change ((1992), 1-
23 at 2-5.  He also notes that the function of section 100 is now purely intergovernmental: there is nothing 
in it that protects the rights of individuals against State laws, and in practice these rights have now been 
subsumed under State legislation. 
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rivers used for interstate trade and commerce purposes.24  In practice, however, the 
management of water resources has been treated as a matter for the States, with the 
Commonwealth Government's role substantially confined to one of moral and financial 
persuasion. 
 
In 1992, the primacy of the States in natural resource management more generally 
was confirmed by the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, an informal 
agreement between State, Territory and Commonwealth Governments setting out 
jurisdictional boundaries.  However, the Agreement recognised the Commonwealth's 
interest in meeting its obligations under international conventions, such as the United 
Nations Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the 
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar Convention), the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity25 and bilateral migratory bird treaties with China26 and Japan27. 
 
Flowing from this, the Commonwealth has recently enacted the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Under this legislation, assessment by 
and approval from the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment is required for 
actions that "are likely to have a significant impact" on specified values, defined as 
“matters of national environmental significance”.28  Many of these so-called “triggers” 
are derived from Australia’s obligations under the international conventions referred to 
above.  They include: 
 
o the ecological character of a declared Ramsar wetland;29 
 
o listed threatened species and ecological communities; 30 or 
 
o listed migratory species.31 
                                               
24 Mason J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, discussed by D Fisher, “Water” in Laws of 
Australia (1995), Chapter 14.9: 1-210 at 31-32. 
25 On the implementation of these Conventions in Australia, see D Farrier and L Tucker, “Wise Use of 
Wetlands under the Ramsar Convention: A Challenge for Meaningful Implementation of International 
Law” (2000) 12 Journal of Environmental Law 21-42; D Farrier and L Tucker, "Beyond a Walk in the 
Park: The Impact of International Nature Conservation Law on Private Land in Australia (1998) 22 
Melbourne University Law Review, 564-591; D Farrier., "Implementing the In-situ Conservation Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity" (1996) 3 Australasian Journal of Natural 
Resources Law and Policy, 1-24. 
26 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and their Environment (CAMBA). 
27 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and their Environment (JAMBA). 
28 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, ss 11-28A. 
29 Fifty six wetlands in Australia have been listed under the Ramsar Convention.  See 
http://www.biodiversity.environment.gov.au/environm/wetlands/ramsar/siteindx.htm  
30 Over 1500 threatened species and 23 endangered communities are listed under the Act: see 
http://www.ea.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/index.html 
31 See http://www.ea.gov.au/bodiversity/threatened/index.html 
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Any activity which has a significant impact on the ecological character of a 
Ramsar wetland is covered, regardless of where it takes place.32  There is, therefore, the 
potential for the Commonwealth Government to become more actively involved in the 
regulation of activities which impact on river flows, particularly on the availability of 
water for extensive wetlands at the end of inland flowing rivers in the Murray-Darling 
Basin.  These provide breeding habitat for migratory and threatened bird species, and 
some of them have been listed as Ramsar wetlands.  Statistics for the period mid-2000 to 
mid-2001 show that the migratory species and Ramsar wetlands triggers led to regulation 
and assessment of 47 and 16 proposed activities respectively, but it is not clear how many 
of these involved river flow issues.33 
 
In practice, this legislation is only likely to impact on the management of instream 
flows at the margins.  Apart from Queensland, where significant irrigation development 
involving new water allocations is on the drawing books, the problems stem largely from 
past allocation policy and existing uses which are exempt from regulation under the 
Commonwealth legislation.34 While the regulatory provisions of the legislation will apply 
to water transfers that are likely to have a significant impact on the environment,35 this 
will have no bearing on the amount of water taken out of the system, as distinct from 
where it is taken out. 
 
In addition, there are questions about how effective the Commonwealth will be as 
a regulator and assessor of private activities.36  The historical fact of State management of 
natural resources has meant that the Commonwealth has limited experience as a natural 
resource regulator, and minimal on-the-ground infrastructure.  There are in fact 
provisions under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act that 
allow the Commonwealth to delegate both its assessment and regulatory functions to the 
States.  It can seek to enter into agreements that accredit State assessment and regulatory 
processes.37  But so far, although the Commonwealth has shown a good deal of 
enthusiasm for developing assessment bilaterals (as distinct from approval bilaterals), the 
response of the States has been lukewarm.38 
 
                                               
32 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 17B. 
33 S Chapple, “The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later,” 
(2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 527-528. 
34 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 523(2). 
35 The definition of “activity” is clearly broad enough to cover transfers: Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 523(1). 
36 See S Chapple, “The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later 
(2001),” 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 535-537. 
37 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, ss 44-65A.. 
38 Only the State of Tasmania has entered into an assessment bilateral agreement with the Commonwealth.  
South Australia has indicated its intention not to enter into such an agreement: S Chapple, “The 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999: One Year Later,” (2001) 18 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523 at 532. 
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The focus of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act is on 
ad hoc, reactive regulation of individual proposals rather than proactive and holistic 
natural resource planning and management.  While there are strategic planning 
provisions, which allow the Commonwealth to make “bioregional plans” in relation to 
Commonwealth areas and to “cooperate” with the States in the preparation of bioregional 
plans elsewhere, including the provision of financial assistance,39 there has so far been no 
attempt to use these to address the needs of riverine ecosystems.    
 
Special Commonwealth/State natural resource management arrangements have 
been put in place for the Murray-Darling Basin.  Management here has long been carried 
out on the basis of a Commonwealth-State partnership, and increasingly over recent years 
the community has been encouraged to take an active role. This is currently reflected in 
the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement of 1992, to which the Commonwealth and the 
States with areas in the Basin are parties.40  Although the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement had its origins in the River Murray Waters Agreement of 1915,41 providing 
for the regulation of the river and the sharing of water between the States concerned, it 
has over the years taken on a broader focus.  The current functions of the Murray-Darling 
Basin Ministerial Council, set up in 1985, now include the determination of major policy 
issues of common interest to the parties "concerning effective planning and management 
for the equitable efficient and sustainable use of the water, land and other environmental 
resources" of the Basin as a whole.42  Resolutions of the Council must, however, be 
unanimous,43 and Implementation remains firmly in the hands of individual States.  This 
is reflected in a complex mass of State legislation relating to resource and environmental 
management, and. in particular for present purposes, water sharing. 
 
In mid-1995, for example, the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council reached 
one of its few unanimous decisions - to "cap" water diversions between July 1995 and 
June 1997 by holding them at the 1993/4 level of development to prevent further 
deterioration, as a first step towards establishing sustainable levels of extraction.44  But 
the implementation of what has become known as the Murray-Darling Basin Cap has 
                                               
39 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 176. 
40 The new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement was signed by the Commonwealth, NSW, Victoria and SA in 
1992, replacing the River Murray Waters Agreement.  Queensland became a party in 1996, and the ACT in 
1998.  The Agreement has been ratified by each jurisdiction through mirror legislation: Murray-Darling 
Basin Commission, “The Murray-Darling Basin Agreement,” available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au 
41 S D Clark, “Intergovernmental Quangos: The River Murray Commission,” (1983) Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, 154-172. 
42 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, cl 9(a). 
43 Ibid, cl 12(3). 
44 Australia State of the Environment 2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister 
for the Environment and Heritage (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), Thematic Findings.  Available at 
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/water.html 
 10
been dogged by controversy because of the differing approaches taken by the various 
States.45 
 
Recent Commonwealth policy settings in relation to water resource management 
more generally, show no inclination to move away from a position which, while striving 
for agreement at the level of principle, sees each State administering its own legislation.  
Examples of current State legislation are discussed in later sections of this paper. 
 
 
Historical Underpinnings of Water Resource Management in Australia 
 
Following the substantial rejection at the end of the nineteenth century of the 
doctrine of riparianism, exported from England but found to be too inhibiting to 
development in a country where water was scarce, each of the Australian states adopted 
an administrative system for allocating water.  This was based on assumption of a right of 
primary access by the state, with water allocated for consumptive uses through a system 
of licences and other authorisations granted for specified periods.46  In theory, at least, 
this system allowed for considerable flexibility.47  In practice it led to significant 
overcommitment of available water resources,48 about which nothing was done until very 
recently. 
 
As developed in New South Wales,49 the main features of this system prior to 
recent reforms were:50 
 
o Assumption by the state of the exclusive right to use and control water.51 
                                               
45 For the problems which have arisen in Queensland because of that State’s position that it should be 
allowed to catch up with the more developed States in the Basin, see Poh-Ling Tan, “Conflict over Water 
Resources in Queensland: all Eyes on the Lower Balonne,” (2000) 17 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 545-568 at 560-561. 
46 R H Bartlet, “The Development of Water Law in Western Australia” in R H Bartlet, A Gardner, and B 
Humphries, Water Resources Law and Management in Western Australia (1995), 43-116; D Fisher, 
“Water” in Laws of Australia (1995), chapter 14.9: 1-210. 
47 S D Clark and I A Renard, The Law of Allocation of Water for Private Use (Australian Water Resources 
Council Research Project 69/16, 1972). 
48 See the discussion of overallocation in Queensland in Poh-Ling Tan, “Conflict over Water Resources in 
Queensland: all Eyes on the Lower Balonne,” (2000) 17 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 545-
568; and in Victoria, Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk 
Entitlements in the Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 154-187 at 160-161. 
49 On the development of water law in the State of West Australia, see R H Bartlet, “The Development of 
Water Law in Western Australia” in R H Bartlet, A Gardner, and B Humphries, Water Resources Law and 
Management in Western Australia (1995), 43-116.  On the development of water law in Victoria, see Poh-
Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the Goulburn 
and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-187. 
50 D Farrier, R Lyster, L Pearson and Z Lipman, Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in 
New South Wales (3rd edition, 1999), chapter 12. 
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o The annexation of water allocations for consumptive uses to particular areas 
of land, such that transfer of the land involved transfer of the water allocation, 
and the water allocation could not be transferred independently.  In 
combination with low water charges (see below), this led to water allocations 
being capitalised into land values even where they had not been used.52 
 
o Water charges traditionally only covering part of the cost of delivering water 
from dams to the point of extraction ("running the rivers), with irrigators 
making no contribution to capital, maintenance and refurbishment costs of 
water storages, or to the costs of managing the resource (including planning, 
resource evaluation and granting permits). 
 
o Traditionally, indirect control of water use through restrictions on the area of 
land that could be irrigated rather than on the amount of water used.  This 
approach has now been replaced on rivers regulated by head storages by 
volumetric water allocations schemes, and is gradually being introduced on 
unregulated rivers.  These allow the irrigation of any area within assigned 
volumetric limits. 
 
o No automatic loss of rights for failure to use allocations.  Although there was 
the theoretical possibility that they might be terminated or not renewed for 
lack of beneficial use, this did not occur in practice.  This led to a considerable 
number of so-called "sleeper" licences, held by farmers or graziers with no 
history of use, and "dozer" licences, held by small scale or retired irrigators 
who did not have the resources to fully utilise their allocation or merely used 
it in times of drought. 
 
In southern NSW and northern Victoria, large, publicly funded irrigation schemes 
were established by State governments on both Crown and private land to promote closer 
settlement, particularly of returned soldiers.  Over time, more land came to be irrigated 
under these schemes than through private licensed diversions.  In particular, in Victoria, 
of the 77% of water used for irrigation, 75% was distributed through public irrigation 
schemes. 53  This has had a fundamental influence on the shape of Victorian water law. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
51 See A Gardner,  “Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water 
Reforms,” (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33 at 8-9. 
52 M Bond and D Farrier, “Transferable Water Allocations - Property Rights or Shimmering Mirage” 
(1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 213-224. 
53 Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the 
Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria.” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-
187; D Farrier, R Lyster, L Pearson and Z Lipman, Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use 
in New South Wales (3rd edition, 1999), 470-475. 
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A key feature of the administrative system as it evolved in Australia was its 
failure to guarantee security of supply to irrigators.  The prior appropriation doctrine that 
governs water allocation for consumptive uses in the Western States of the USA 
guarantees priority of access to water based on order of historical usage, provided that 
beneficial use of the quantity claimed has not been abandoned.  If there is not enough 
water to go round, junior appropriators must give way to senior appropriators.54  By 
contrast, those with water allocations under Australian administrative systems generally 
share the pain.   
 
In NSW, aside from the priority given to restricted riparian rights for domestic 
supply/stock watering, town water supplies and "high security" supplies (originally 
designed for permanent plantings), irrigators in particular catchments are equally 
vulnerable to water shortages in any particular year.  This may see irrigators in some 
valleys receiving only an across-the-board percentage of their notional allocation.  This is 
principally the case with certain valleys in the north of the Murray-Darling Basin where 
security of supply can be as low as 35% (on average, 100% of the notional allocation can 
be expected in only 35% of the years).  While from one perspective this lack of security 
of supply is an inevitable feature of natural systems, it stems fundamentally from human 
optimism in notionally allocating a resource that is not guaranteed to be available. 
 
Apart from this seasonal insecurity stemming from variable climatic conditions, 
the security of those with existing allocations was inevitably devalued by the grant of 
further licences in situations if embargoes on the grant of new licences were not put in 
place.  The uncertainty generated by these factors led cotton irrigators in some valleys, 
encouraged in the past by the State water agency, to invest in large off-river water 
storages, which they have filled during declared "off-allocation" periods  - flood events or 
natural run-off not intercepted by the dam - when the flow in the river was judged to 
exceed immediate requirements and irrigators were allowed to divert water above and 
beyond their allocation under licence.  This has further interfered with instream flows. 
 
Even though there was grudging acceptance by irrigators that the amount of water 
available at any particular time would vary, licences themselves came to be regarded as 
de facto property rights.  The legislation required licences to be renewed periodically, but 
this was done by the water management agency as a matter of course.  Although the 
agency could modify licences without payment of compensation, to provide for instream 
environmental flows for example, in practice this was not done.55 
 
 
                                               
54 J Sax and R H Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases and Materials (1986), 278-285. 
55 See, for example, Water Act 1912 (NSW), s 17A(2) and Water Resources Act 1989 (Q), s 
44(1)(f),(2),(3). 
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Ecologically Sustainable Development 
 
On paper at least, the key driver of natural resources policy in Australia is the 
objective of ecologically sustainable development (ESD).  ESD represents Australia's 
response to calls for sustainable development embodied in the 1987 Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland).56  In 
December 1992 the Commonwealth Government released a National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development, developed by an intergovernmental committee, 
and endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments.57 
 
The core objectives of the Strategy are:58 
 
o to enhance individual and community well-being and welfare by following a 
path of economic development that safeguards the welfare of future 
generations; 
 
o to provide for equity within and between generations; 
 
o to protect biological diversity and maintain essential ecological processes and 
life support systems. 
 
The guiding principles include the integration of economic, environmental, social 
and equity considerations in decision-making processes, the precautionary principle, the 
need to develop a strong, growing and diversified economy, the use of cost effective and 
flexible policy instruments, such as improved valuation and pricing and incentive 
mechanisms, and community involvement.  The strategy emphasises the need for a 
balanced approach, with no objective or principle predominating over the others.59 
 
            The concept of ESD has now begun to appear in environmental and resource 
management legislation enacted by the Australian States.  In NSW, the Protection of the 
Environment Administration Act 1991 states that ESD “requires the effective integration 
of economic and environmental considerations in decision-making processes”.  It goes on 
to set out the principles which can be used to achieve ESD: 
 
(a) the precautionary principle namely, that if there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
                                               
56 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland Report) 
(1990). 
57 Commonwealth of Australia, Ecologically Sustainable Development: A Commonwealth Discussion 
Paper (1992). 
58 Ibid, 8. 
59 Ibid, 9. 
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In the application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions 
should be guided by: 
 
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment, and 
 
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options, 
 
(b) inter-generational equity namely, that the present generation should ensure 
that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment are maintained or 
enhanced for the benefit of future generations, 
 
(c) conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity namely that 
conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration 
 
(d) improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms namely, that 
environmental factors should be included in the valuation of assets and services, 
such as: 
 
(i)  polluter pays that is, those who generate pollution and waste should bear 
the cost of containment, avoidance or abatement, 
 
(ii) the users of goods and services should pay prices based on the full life 
cycle of costs of providing goods and services, including the use of natural 
resources and assets and the ultimate disposal of any waste, 
 
(iii) environmental goals, having been established, should be pursued in the 
most cost effective way, by establishing incentive structures, including 
market mechanisms, that enable those best placed to maximise benefits or 
minimise costs to develop their own solutions and responses to 
environmental problems.60  
 
 
The objects of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) are: 
 
to provide for the sustainable and integrated management of the water sources of 
the State for the benefit of both present and future generations and, in particular: 
 
(a) to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development ……61 
 
                                               
60 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s 6(2). 
61 As defined in Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s 6(2), above. 
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The purpose of the Queensland legislation is “sustainable management”, but this 
requires the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems to be protected, and it 
must contribute to the “economic development of Queensland in accordance with the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development”.62 
 
Other State legislation, while talking in terms of sustainability, avoids a specific 
commitment to ecological sustainability. The Water Act 1989 (Vic) simply refers to 
“sustainable use for the benefit of present and future Victorians”, leaving this concept 
undefined, and omitting any reference to the precautionary principle, or the significance 
of biological diversity. 
 
Similarly, the South Australian legislation makes a commitment to use and 
manage water resources to “sustain the physical, economic and social well being of the 
people of the State”.  However, it balances this by also talking in terms of protecting 
ecosystems, including their biological diversity, and ensuring that water resources are 
able to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.63 
 
One of the key features of the concept of ecologically sustainable development is 
its commitment to the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity 
regardless of the contribution this makes to the sustainability of human systems.  
Secondly, the precautionary principle outlaws arguments that we should delay taking 
action until there is overwhelming scientific evidence of adverse impact on instream 
biodiversity and ecosystems.  This is developed more fully in a later section.  Thirdly, 
there is a strong emphasis in ESD on ensuring that natural resources are appropriately 
valued, rather than simply being costless externalities in production processes.  This has 
significant implications for arguments that the most efficient way of redistributing what 
are now scarce water resources is to create so-called "property rights" in allocations for 
consumptive uses and allow them to be traded in the market place.  The market has a 
miserable record when it comes to factoring public costs stemming from environmental 
degradation into private decision-making processes.  Steps must therefore be taken to put 
in place procedures that protect the public interest in protecting ecological values. 
 
On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis in the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development not only on inter-generational equity, but intra-
generational equity.64 
 
                                               
62 Water Act 2000(Q), s 10.  ESD is defined in similar terms to the NSW definition, with the addition of 
recognition of the need to develop a strong, growing and diversified economy to enhance the capacity for 
environmental protection, and to allow broad community involvement in decisions and actions: Water Act 
2000(Q), s 11. 
63 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 6(1)(a). 
64 Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (December 
1992), 8. 
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Governments are concerned . . . that any ESD-related actions and 
decisions do not result in an unequal burden of adjustment on particular 
regions, sectors or groups in society.65 
 
Surprisingly, references to equity within the current generation are missing from the 
definitions which appear in the NSW and Queensland water management legislation 
discussed above, but it has a stronger presence in the Victorian66 and South Australian 
legislation. 
 
In the context of water resource management, significant intra-generational equity 
questions are raised by arguments examined below that, in order to provide for 
ecologically sustainable instream flows, water will have to be "clawed back" from 
existing consumptive users.  As noted above, historical water allocations have been 
factored into land values, and some irrigators have invested heavily in infrastructure such 
as large off-river water storages, in the expectation that there would be no radical changes 
to government policy.  Indeed, until recent times, government policy has been to actively 
encourage such investment.  In these circumstances, issues relating to compensation and 
the payment of financial incentives (for example to enhance the efficiency of irrigation 
systems) will inevitably surface.  This is dealt with further in a later section.  In practice, 
the concern must be that unless water planners and managers are able to make some 
financial offering when making decisions about providing water for the environment, 
they will inevitably find the socio-economic circumstances of water users to be a more 
compelling consideration in the decision-making calculus than the inchoate interests of 
anonymous future generations in the conservation of biological diversity, or, even more 
so, than the notion that we should conserve biological diversity as an end in itself.  Unless 
we are prepared to confront squarely the issue of intragenerational equity, we are 
unlikely to persuade decision-makers to take seriously issues of intergenerational equity 
and the conservation of biological diversity. 
  
 
National Policy Settings Relating to Water Resource Management 
 
Within the broad commitment to ESD, national policy settings relating 
specifically to quantity aspects of water resource management were established in 
Australia in 1994 with the development by the Council of Australian Governments 
(CoAG) of a strategic framework designed to achieve an “efficient and sustainable water 
industry”.67  This framework incorporated commitments to pricing based on full-cost 
recovery, clear specification of property rights in terms of ownership, volume, reliability 
and transferability, the separation of these rights from land title, allocations to the 
                                               
65 Ibid, 10. 
66 One of the purposes of the Victorian legislation is to “promote the orderly, equitable and efficient use of 
water resources”: Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 1(c). 
67 CoAG, Communique, Hobart, 25 February 1994, Attachment A, para 2; Report of the Working Group on 
Water Resource Policy to the Council of Australian Governments, February 1994. 
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environment “as a legitimate user of water”, the establishment of water trading, and the 
adoption of an approach to water resource management based on integrated catchment 
management.68  Progress in water reform in the States was annexed to tranche payments 
made by the Commonwealth to the States under the National Competition Policy. 
  
The issue of environmental flows is intertwined with one of the other CoAG 
commitments - the clear specification of so-called “property rights” in water.  This is in 
turn linked closely to the commitment to establish a water market which will enhance 
water use efficiency by facilitating its movement from lower to higher value uses – from 
irrigated pasture to cotton and vines, for example.  The interrelationship between 
environmental flows and property rights raises a number of questions which will be 
explored further in this paper through analysis of State legislation enacted in response to 
the CoAG strategic framework.: 
 
o To what extent will water be clawed back from existing water users to satisfy 
ecological requirements where the resource has been overallocated? 
 
o Will existing users be compensated where allocations are reduced to satisfy 
ecological requirements? 
 
o Will the precautionary principle be applied in situations where the science 
relating to ecological requirements is uncertain, to allow evidence of 
environmental impact which may not meet traditional cannons of scientific 
proof to be incorporated into decision-making processes?   
 
o Will adaptive management principles be applied where ecological 
requirements are unclear, and how will such principles be reconciled with 
water user demands for security of title? 
 
o Where watercourses are not yet overcommitted, will ecological requirements 
be given clear priority over what some may see as a public interest in the 
social and economic development of particular areas through the expansion of 
irrigation? 
 
            In 1994, CoAG took a clear position when it came to balancing the public interest 
in environmental flows against future irrigation activity: environmental requirements 
must be adequately met before further extraction was allowed.  But it was equivocal 
where the public interest required water to be clawed back for the environment from 
existing users in overcommitted river systems.  Here the CoAG commitment was only to 
provide a “better balance in water resource use including appropriate allocations to the 
                                               
68 Ibid, Attachment A. 
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environment in order to enhance/restore the health of river systems”.69  On top of this, 
environmental requirements were to be determined on the basis of “the best scientific 
information available”.70  There was no reference to the precautionary principle, espoused 
by the National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development as a fundamental 
principle. 
 
In a later policy position paper, National Principles for the Provision of Water for 
Ecosystems,71 now used by the National Competition Council as a basis for assessing 
State progress in water resources reform,72 there was no such equivocation about 
priorities: 
 
Where environmental water requirements cannot be met due to existing 
uses, action (including reallocation) should be taken to meet 
environmental needs. 
 
            While issues related to water quantity represented the main theme in the early 
CoAG documents, there were also references to broader aspects of water resource 
management.  The 1994 Communique  agreed to adopt an integrated catchment approach 
to natural resource management, and committed support to work that had already begun 
on the development of a National Water Quality Management Strategy (NWQMS),73 
including the establishment of catchment management policies. 74  Later in the same year, 
a reference document was released under the NWQMS in which catchment management 
                                               
69 Ibid, Attachment A, para 4.  The Working Group adverted to this issue, but failed to take a position on 
priorities, leaving it to each State to determine: Report of the Working Group on Water Resource Policy to 
the Council of Australian Governments, February 1994, para 5.9. 
70 Ibid, Attachment A, clause  4. 
71 ARMCANZ (Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand)  and 
ANZECC (Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council), National Principles for 
the Provision of Water for Ecosystems, Occasional Paper SWR No 3 (July 1996).  Clause 4(c) of 
Attachment A of the CoAG Communique, Hobart, 25 February 1994, specifically instructed State 
governments to have regard to the work of ARMCANZ and ANZECC in allocating water to the 
environment. 




73 The objective of the National Water Quality Management Strategy, developed by two 
Commonwealth/State Ministerial Councils (ARMCANZ and ANZECC), starting in 1992, is “to achieve 
sustainable use of the nation’s water resources by protecting and enhancing their quality while maintaining 
economic and social development”: ARMCANZ and ANZECC, Policies and Principles: a Reference 
Document (National Water Quality Management Strategy, April 1994), para 3.2. 
74 CoAG, Communique, Hobart, 25 February 1994, Attachment A, cll 6(b), 8(b). The report on which the 
Communique was based recommended as one of its principles the “[a]doption of an integrated catchment 
management approach to water resource management: Report of the Working Group on Water Resource 
Policy to the Council of Australian Governments, February 1994, para 3.3.  See A Gardner,  “Water 
Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water Reforms,” (2002) 19 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33. 
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was identified as a key aspect of the process for addressing diffuse pollution.75  
Catchment management was described as “a holistic approach to natural resource 
management within a catchment with water quality considered in relation to land use and 
other natural resources; co-ordination of all the agencies, levels of government and 
interest groups within the catchment; extensive opportunity for community consultation 
and participation”.  It was a “bottom-up approach which built local ownership of the 
environmental objectives identified”.76  More recently, catchment management has 
become a more dominant theme at a federal level in the context of the National Action 
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality.77 
 
            Even within the narrow context of river flow issues, it is now recognised that 
environmental requirements cannot be met simply through allocating quantities of water 
to the environment, so called “environmental contingency allowances”.  We are also 
talking about seasonal flow patterns78 and water temperature.  The aim is to “mimic” 
natural variations in seasonal flow.79  But issues relating to quantity and flow are only 
one aspect of the ecological needs of riverine ecosystems. In Northern NSW, dryland 
salinity caused by the clearing of native vegetation is having a dramatic effect on water 
quality.80  Faecal coliforms attributable to cattle and on-site sewage disposal systems are 
a major problem in some coastal rivers.  But even when we extend the agenda to include 
water quality issues, we do not go far enough.  The NSW Healthy Rivers Commission 
found that expert advice to its inquiries on coastal rivers was unanimously of the view 
that riverine vegetation management was a critical determinant of river health.81   
 
 Catchment management is as much about land as water management.  While it 
has traditionally concentrated on water quality issues flowing from land use, the link 
between land management and the quantity of water flowing down rivers has now 
emerged on the policy agenda, with the growing realisation that vegetation planted to 
                                               
75 ARMCANZ and ANZECC, Policies and Principles: a Reference Document (National Water Quality 
Management Strategy, April 1994), paras 8.1, 9. 
76 Ibid, para 9.1. 
77 A National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (October 2000, Commonwealth Government).  
See also National Natural Resource Management Task Force, Managing Natural Resources in Rural 
Australia for a Sustainable Future: A Discussion Paper for Developing a National Policy (December 
1999); Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Integrated Catchment Management in the Murray-
Darling Basin 2001-2010: Delivering a Sustainable Future (June 2001); House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage, Coordinating Catchment Management, Report of the 
Inquiry into Catchment Management (December 2000). 
78 ARMCANZ and ANZECC, National Principles for the Provision of Water for Ecosystems, Occasional 
Paper SWR No 3 (July 1996), 4. 
79 P Knights, B Fitzgerald and R Denham, “Environmental Flow Policy Development in NSW” in 
Proceedings of the National Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (1995), 252-261. 
80 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, The Salinity Audit of the Murray-Darling Basin (1999). 
81 Healthy Rivers Commission, Securing Healthy Coastal Rivers: A Strategic Perspective (April 2000), 38. 
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remediate dryland salinity and to capture Greenhouse gas emissions will also reduce the 
amount of run-off into streams.82 
 
As a result of this emerging catchment perspective in Australia, the historical 
divide in water resource management between natural resources legislation addressing 
water quantity issues and more recent environmental legislation dealing with water 
quality, is breaking down.  Associated with this is a movement away from ad hoc 
regulation of individual project proposals to an increasing focus on planning across the 
whole catchment.  These trends are now reflected in a number of pieces of State water 
legislation, discussed below. 
 
 
Institutional Structures for Water Planning 
 
            An early policy position paper from a Task Force set up to advance the CoAG 
water reform agenda made it clear that recognition of property rights in water should only 
take place against a backdrop of catchment planning based on partnerships between 
government, water users, other interest groups and the broader community.  Principle 1 
stated: 
 
That all consumptive and non-consumptive water entitlements be allocated 
and managed in accordance with comprehensive planning systems and 
based on full basin-wide hydrologic assessment of the resource.83 
 
All of the Murray-Darling Basin States are now moving away from water 
allocation systems which have traditionally relied on the ad hoc grant of water licences, 
in the process leading to significant overcommitment of the resource in many areas.  
They are committed to the implementation of planning processes which will determine 
the overall quantity of water available for extraction by irrigators from particular water 
resources, and the conditions under which it will become available (timing, etc), setting 
the broad parameters within which licensed allocations are managed. 84 Planning 
initiatives are currently focused on stressed or environmentally sensitive rivers. 
 
                                               
82 R A Vertessy, “The Impacts of Forestry on Streamflows: A Review,” in J Croke and P 
Lane, eds, Forest Management for Water Quality and Quantity, Proceedings of the Second 
Forest Erosion Workshop (May 1999). 
83 ARMCANZ, Water Allocations and Entitlements: A National Framework for the Implementation of 
Property Rights in Water, Task Force on CoAG Water Reform Occasional Paper No 1 (October 1995), 5.  
A property right was defined to exist “when the community supports and protects the exclusive use and 
enjoyment of an entitlement and allows that entitlement to be traded or passed to others (at 1). 
84The Victorian planning provisions relating to surface waters are still in draft form: Water (Irrigation Farm 
Dams) Bill 2001.  For a discussion of the recently established water planning system in Western Australia, 
see A Gardner,  “Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water 
Reforms,” (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33 at 16-20. 
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In Queensland, plan-making is fully centralised.  The Minister through the 
responsible State government agency, is responsible for preparing water resource plans.85  
Community input is through a community reference panel,86 and public exhibition of the 
draft plan.87  The community is a sounding-board rather than a partner. 
 
NSW, on the other hand, has opted for a partnership arrangement between 
government and the community.  Water management committees are responsible for the 
preparation of water management plans in their areas, assisted by officers from the 
Department of Land and Water Conservation.88  However, committees must work to 
terms of reference fixed by the Minister,89 and a State Water Management Outcomes 
Plan, with which water management plans must be consistent.  The Minister makes the 
final decision on whether to approve a plan,90 after it has been placed on exhibition for 
public comment.91   
 
On paper, therefore, water management committees in NSW are heavily 
constrained in their decision-making by State government.  In practice, however, the 
strength and, at the same time, the potential weakness of committees inheres in their 
consensus decision-making processes, and the specific requirement that decisions to 
submit draft plans to the Minister must be unanimous.92  Members of committees are 
appointed by the Minister not for their expertise in water resource management, but to 
represent a range of community interests, including water users, conservation, local 
government and Aboriginal people.  They must also include at least two people 
nominated by government interests, and in practice they include broad representation 
across government agencies involved in resource management (National Parks, Fisheries, 
Environment Protection Authority, Agriculture). This broadly based membership means 
that consensus will be difficult to reach.  But the presence of government agencies around 
the table, alongside resource users and conservation interests, means that if it is achieved, 
it will be difficult for the Minister to countermand. 
 
The advantage of the NSW approach is that water users play an active role in the 
consensus decision-making process that makes the rules with which they must ultimately 
comply.  We might therefore hypothesise greater ownership of those rules and fewer 
compliance problems.  They do not, however, dominate the process and undermine its 
                                               
85 Water Act 2000 (Q), s 38(1). 
86 Ibid, ss 41, 47(i).  The legislation simply says that the panel must include  representatives of cultural , 
economic and environmental interests in the area. 
87 Ibid, ss 40, 47(o). 
88 There is also provision for plans to be made directly by the Minister: Water Management Act 2000 
(NSW), s 50.  As a matter of law the first round of planning is being carried out under these provisions, but 
in practice the Minister has committed himself to working through water management committees. 
89 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 15(1). 
90 Ibid, s 41.  The concurrence of the Minister for the Environment is required. 
91 Ibid, s 38.  Plans are binding to the extent that licences may not be granted unless permitted by a plan (s 
63), and water use approvals may not be granted in contravention of a plan (s 95(3)). 
92 Ibid, Schedule 6, cl 12. 
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credibility in terms of protecting the public interest.  The proposed arrangements in 
Victoria also provide for committees (consultative committees) representing community 
interests to prepare plans for ministerial approval, but their membership is heavily 
weighted towards consumptive interests.  If the area concerned is a “farming area” at 
least half of the membership must be farmers who own or occupy farming land in the 
area, appointed after consultation with the Victorian Farmers Federation.93 
 
South Australia has gone much further in terms of delegating responsibility to 
regional bodies.  Here, water allocation plans are prepared by catchment water 
management boards, where they have been appointed,94 or otherwise water resources 
planning committees.95 Unlike the NSW committees, catchment water management 
boards are incorporated,96  can employ97 and can construct and manage infrastructure.98  
Members are appointed on the basis of their expertise rather than as representatives of 
particular interest groups.  The presiding member of a Board must have managerial skills 
and experience.  Other expertise required includes conservation, water use and 
management, local government, public or business administration and regional economic 
development.  Only one member has to be drawn from the local community.99  Decisions 
need only be by a majority.100  Plans do, however, need the approval of the Minister 
before they come into operation, 101 and they must be consistent with the State Water 
Plan.102 
 
The South Australian boards are responsible for plan implementation as well as 
preparation.103 They can levy rates on licensed water users, subject to parliamentary 
veto,104 making them much more independent than the NSW committees which do not 
have their own budgets and are dependent on agency allocations.  They can provide 
financial assistance to anyone engaged in activities relating to water resource 
management,105 and they can also give rebates on levies where water conservation or land 
                                               
93 Water (Irrigation Farm Dams) Bill 2001, cll 29, 32A. 
94 In this case, the water allocation plan forms part of the catchment water management plan: Water 
Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 101(3). 
95 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 101.  Water resource management committees more closely resemble 
water management committees in NSW, although unlike the NSW committees, membership is based on 
expertise, decisions are by a majority and committees are incorporated: Ibid, ss 82, 83.  Their primary 
responsibility is the preparation of a water allocation plan: Ibid, s 84. 
96 Ibid, s 55. 
97 Subject to the Minister’s approval: Ibid, s 70. 
98 Ibid, ss 62, 63. 
99 Ibid, ss 58-59. 
100 Ibid, s 60 and Schedule 2, cl 5. 
101 Ibid, ss 95(4), 99(1), 104(4). 
102 Ibid, ss 92(6), 101(5). 
103 Ibid, s 61(a). 
104 Ibid, s 95(8)-(15). 
105 Ibid, s 64(1)(a). 
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management practices have been implemented.106   They must carry out annual reviews 
of implementation programmes in plans and estimated revenue and expenditure.107 
 
Bellette has argued that a crucial feature of the South Australian arrangements is 
secure funding.108  The levy is determined by needs identified in the plan, sourced from 
the local community, and invested back into that community.  This allows workforce 
stability, and the retention of a vital knowledge base.  Annual reviews, incorporating the 
approval of the Economic and Finance Committee of Parliament, assess Board 
performance against indicators contained in the plan, in determining whether to approve 
the proposed amount of the levy for the following year. 109 
 
 
Setting Priorities for Water Sharing 
 
One of the crucial issues emerging in water management legislation and planning 
processes is the extent to which values related to river health and ecosystem 
maintenance/restoration should take priority over consumptive values.  In the context of 
water sharing, for example, must water first be set aside to satisfy ecosystem 
requirements before determining how much is available for extraction?  We have already 
seen in the discussion of ecologically sustainable development that this raises significant 
tensions between the interests of existing users, on the one hand, and the commitment to 
intergenerational equity and the conservation of biological diversity on the other. 
 
At one extreme, Victoria’s Water Act 1989 does not even mention ecosystems 
when it comes to defining its purposes.  The closest it comes to acknowledging their 
significance is in a general commitment “to provide formal means for the protection and 
enhancement of the environmental qualities of waterways and their in-stream uses,110 and 
to provide “protection of catchment conditions”.111  On the other hand, it makes an 
unequivocal commitment “to continue in existence and to protect” all existing public and 
private rights to water.112  Poh-Ling Tan’s analysis of the implementation of the Victorian 
legislation in two catchments where there is extensive irrigation indicates that ecological 
                                               
106 Ibid, s 140. 
107 Ibid, s 97(1). 
108 Ibid, Part 8, Division 1. 
109 K Bellette, “Legislation and Policy – One Sixth of the Equation for Integrated Water Resource 
Management,” paper given to the 3rd Australasian Natural Resource Law and Policy Conference: Focus on 
Water, Adelaide, 22-23 March, 2001. 
110 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 1(j). 
111 Ibid, s 1(k). 
112 Ibid, s 1(m).  See, generally the discussion of the objectives of the Victorian legislation by Poh-Ling 
Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the Goulburn and 
Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-187 at 163-164. 
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requirements have taken a back seat in practice.113  In the Goulburn-Broken catchment, 
bulk entitlements initially given to water supply authorities did not involve any claw-back 
from irrigators.  Moreover, an adjustment mechanism was not built in, so that it will be 
difficult to allocate water to satisfy ecosystem needs in the future without buying it on the 
open market or making efficiency savings.  In the Murray, some water that had 
traditionally been available to irrigators was held back, but at the same time “sleeper” and 
“dozer” licences were allowed to activate, making water available through the transfer 
market.  While a specific bulk entitlement has been issued for the Kerang wetlands, this 
was mainly to combat salinity, in which irrigators have a direct self-interest.  Moreover, 
there are significant financial issues involved in actually delivering the water to the 
wetlands, leading to pressures to raise funds through temporary transfers of the 
entitlement to consumptive users. 
 
On paper, at least, the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) clearly gives priority 
to the provision of water to satisfy ecological requirements.  Section 5(3) spells out water 
sharing principles: 
 
(a) sharing of water from a water source must protect the water source and its 
dependent ecosystems, and 
 
(b) sharing of water from a water source must protect the basic land holder 
rights of owners of land,114 and 
 
(c) sharing or extraction of water under any other right must not prejudice the 
principles set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).115 
 
It is the duty of those with functions under the legislation, including water management 
committees developing water management plans, to take all reasonable steps to do so in 
accordance with these principles, and to promote them, and to “give priority to [the water 
sharing principles] in the order in which they are set out” in section 5(3).116 
 
Other provisions require committees to “have due regard to the socio-economic 
impacts” of plan proposals,117 and to exercise functions consistently with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development.118  But there is nothing here which would disturb 
the prioritisation established by section 5(3).  Any person can bring an action to restrain a 
                                               
113 Poh-Ling Tan, “Irrigators Come First: Conversion of Existing Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the 
Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 154-187 
at 168-182. 
114 This refers principally to riparian rights to take water for stock and domestic purposes, and the right of 
landholders to take a percentage of run-off from their land. 
115 Emphasis supplied. 
116 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 9. 
117 Ibid, s 18. 
118 Ibid, s 14(3). 
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breach of the Act,119 for example, if socio-economic considerations are allowed to 
override those relating to ecological flows. 
 
The water sharing provisions of water management plans in NSW must establish 
environmental water rules relating to the identification, establishment and maintenance of 
each of three classes of environmental water.120  Environmental health water is “water 
that is committed for fundamental ecosystem health at all times” and cannot be taken for 
other purposes.  Supplementary environmental water is committed for environmental 
purposes (for example, water bird breeding), but when not needed can be used for other 
purposes.  Adaptive environmental water is water that has been allocated to someone 
under an access licence but is committed for specified environmental purposes, which can 
be limited to time and circumstance.121 
 
In preparing a water resource plan in Queensland, the Minister is required to 
advance the “sustainable management” of water.122  This is defined as management 
which: 
(a) allows for the allocation and use of water for the physical, economic and 
social well being of the people …… within limits that can be sustained 
indefinitely; and 
 
(b) protects the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems; as well as 
“contributing” to a number of other objectives, including “the economic 
development of Queensland in accordance with the principles of ecologically 
sustainable development”.123 
 
There is perhaps an argument here that the reference to allocation and use of an 
undefined quantity of water for consumptive purposes is trumped by the unqualified 
commitment, not simply to conserve but to protect ecosystems.  In addition, one of the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development is that “the conservation of biological 
diversity and ecological integrity should be a fundamental consideration in decision-
making”.124  On the other hand, section 47 of the Act simply spells out a long list of 
factors to be “considered” when preparing a plan, and water flows to support ecosystems 
is simply one of many.125  Water resource plans must establish not only environmental 
flow objectives, but also water allocation security objectives.126 
 
                                               
119 Ibid, s 336. 
120 Ibid, s 20. 
121 Ibid, s 8. 
122 Water Act 2000 (Q), ss 12, 10(1), 38. 
123 Ibid, s 10(2). 
124 Ibid, s 11(f), emphasis supplied. 
125 Ibid, s 47(c). 
126 Ibid, s 46(3). 
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At first sight, a similar argument to that made in relation to the Queensland 
legislation can be made in relation to the South Australian Water Resources Act 1997.127  
Those operating under the legislation must act consistently with and seek to further its 
objects.128  Again there is a reference to “protecting” ecosystems which could be 
interpreted as a condition precedent to sustaining the physical, economic and social well 
being of the people of the State and facilitating economic development.129  On the other 
hand, while water allocation plans must assess the water needs of dependent ecosystems, 
including the timing of those needs, and must make sure that the rate of use is 
sustainable, they must provide for water allocation and use, so that “an equitable balance 
is achieved between social, economic and environmental needs for the water”.130  The 
language of “equitable balance” does not suggest that any priority is to be given to 
satisfying ecosystem needs even where scientifically proven.  Nor  does the legislation 
even appear to restrict socio-economic claims to water to those who already hold water 
allocations, as distinct from those who may seek to secure them in the future. 
 
Whatever the formal position under the Queensland legislation, Coffey’s detailed 
analysis of two of the first water management plans to be made in Australia,131 suggests 
that it is developmental imperatives rather than ecosystem needs that are setting the 
agenda.  She discusses the concept of “environmental flow limits” (efl),  used in the 
Queensland water planning process in an attempt to identify the maximum acceptable 
level of departure from the natural flow regime.  Beyond this there is considered to be an 
increased risk of unacceptable environmental change.  She found that the environmental 
flow objectives set in the Burnett Basin water resource plan on a number of occasions 
exceeded the environmental flow limit even though existing allocations were within the 
                                               
127 See also Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA), s 4, following recent amendments in 2000, 
discussed by A Gardner,  “Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG 
Water Reforms,” (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33 at 14-15. 
128 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 6(2). 
129 In full, section 6(1) provides: 
The object of this Act is to establish a system for the use and management of the water 
resources of the State-  
       (a) that ensures that the use and management of those resources sustain the 
physical, economic and social well being of the people of the State and facilitate the 
economic development of the State while-  
       (i) ensuring that those resources are able to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs 
of future generations; and  
       (ii) protecting the ecosystems (including their biological diversity) that depend on 
those resources; and  
       (b) that, by requiring the use of caution and other safeguards, reduces to a minimum the 
detrimental effects of that use and management. 
130 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 101(4). 
131 F C Coffey, “Assessment of Water Resource Plans under the Water Act 2000 (Qld): Ecological 
Outcomes and Environmental Flow Objectives in the Context of the Precautionary Principle and 
Sustainable Management,” (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 410-436. 
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flow limit.  In other words, intra-generational equity arguments were not founded on the 
interests of existing water users but on the broad public interest in enhancing 
development through future allocations to consumptive use.  Yet an environmental flow 
objective is defined in the Act as a “flow objective for the protection of the health of 
natural ecosystems for the achievement of ecological outcomes”.132  She argues that the 
approach taken in the Burnett Basin plan amounts to a breach of the precautionary 
principle, which, for her, mandates setting environmental flow objectives within the 
environmental flow limit or, if there is already overallocation, towards this limit. 
 
Again, the Fitzroy Basin Plan contemplates the possibility that environmental 
flows may be compromised by the water demands not only of existing users but also of 
future development:  
 
Where the State decides to accept certain trade-offs in relation to 
environmental flow requirements in order to accommodate existing or 
future development of significant economic and social importance, such 
decisions shall be shown in a transparent manner.133 
 
In practice, water management plans in NSW, currently in draft form, may well 
be in breach of the prioritisation mandated by the legislation.  One of the crucial factors 
here has been the dearth of scientific information on which to base assessments of 
ecosystem requirements.  But here the countervailing value is not a perceived public 
interest in the further allocation of water for consumptive use.  It is accepted that 
westward flowing rivers, at least, are already overcommitted, and embargoes on the issue 
of new licences (other than through transfer) are ordinarily in place.  Rather, the 
countervailing value relates to the protection of the interests of those who can show a 
historical use of water under licence, and even of those who are “sleepers”: those who 
have held licences but never put them to use.  Existing users, at least, can present a much 
more persuasive argument from an intra-generational equity perspective than those 
arguing that we should be prepared to take the risk of carrying out potentially 
unsustainable new development.  There is a compelling argument that new development 
should have to rely on the water transfer market, and in the process advance the public 
interest in moving water to more efficient uses. 
 
 
Protecting Other Environmental Values 
 
Water planning in the Australian States is not restricted to water sharing and 
allocation issues. In NSW, plans can contain provisions relating to water quality,134 the 
                                               
132 Water Act 2000 (Q), Schedule 4: Dictionary. 
133 Water Allocation and Management Plan (Fitzroy Basin) 1999, p 11 (emphasis supplied).  Available at 
www.dnr.qld.gov.au/resourcenet/water/wrp/pdf/fitz/fitzroy_wamp.pdf 
134 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 17(a). 
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prevention of adverse impacts of water use on land,135 drainage and floodplain 
management,136 and the regulation of development impacting on water sources.137  In 
practice, however, one of the frustrations experienced by water management committees 
was that the terms of reference for the first round of plans were confined to water sharing 
issues, preventing trade-offs, such as more water for irrigation in return for better riparian 
management by landholders. 
 
In Queensland, while the legislation is more obviously focused on water sharing 
issues, plans can provide frameworks for “sustainably managing water” and “reversing, 
where practicable, degradation that has occurred in natural ecosystems”.138  Separate 
water use plans can be made,139  and irrigators can be required to prepare land and water 
management plans relating to the use of water on land.140  In South Australia, water 
allocation plans made by catchment water management boards form part of the board’s 
catchment water management plan,141 which deals broadly with issues of water quality 
and quantity, and ecosystem health.142 
 
As plans creep out of the watercourse into the catchment, they must inevitably 
come up against vested interests in the field of land use planning.  This is most obviously 
true where water plans address issues relating to diffuse water pollution, but even plans 
concerned primarily with instream flows and water allocation can raise land use planning 
issues.  Development in the catchment, such as afforestation, can reduce the amount of 
run-off into streams.  New residential subdivisions abutting on river banks may result in 
the creation of new riparian rights to take water for stock and domestic uses, reducing the 
amount of water available for existing users and ecosystems. 
 
Coordination mechanisms will have to be set up to ensure that traditional land use 
planning schemes, on the one hand, and catchment and water management plans on the 
other give a consistent message.  In Australia, local councils have traditionally been 
responsible for developing local land use planning schemes, albeit under the supervision 
of State governments.  Their boundaries are historical, paying no heed to the natural 
boundaries of catchments, and they have shown limited interest in issues of water 
management.  Nevertheless, issues relating to the role of democratically elected local 
councils need to be handled with sensitivity. 
 
The South Australian legislation proceeds cautiously.  The Minister can only 
override a local council’s objection to having its area included in the area of a catchment 
                                               
135 Ibid, s 23. 
136 Ibid, ss 26, 29. 
137 Ibid, ss 32, 34. 
138 Water Act 2000(Q), s 38(3). 
139 Ibid, s 60. 
140 Ibid, ss 72-78. 
141 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 101(3). 
142 Ibid, s 92. 
 29
water management board if convinced that excluding it would undermine the objects of 
setting up the board, and that it is “fair and reasonable” to include the council.143  
Councils are not automatically bound by catchment water management plans: they are 
simply required to consider whether they should implement changes in the way they do 
things where the plan has identified the need for change.144  While plan makers under the 
water legislation can submit proposals for the amendment of land use planning schemes 
to local councils and the responsible Minister, the process for amendment is complex, and 
ultimately, the Minister responsible for land use planning has the power to veto 
proposals.145  In practice, there have been no attempts to use the formal procedure, and 
Boards are more likely to seek to use their powers of persuasion with local government 
than to rely on the formal procedures.146 
 
In NSW, unlike in South Australia, the Minister responsible for land use planning 
only has to be consulted,147 with no power to veto land use regulatory initiatives 
emanating from water management plans.148  Water management plans can incorporate 
“environmental protection provisions” relating to any aspect of water management.  
These provisions can regulate development.  They can identify zones in which 
development is to be controlled “in order to minimise any harm to water sources in the 
area”.149  This would, for example, allow water management committees to make 
enforceable provisions regulating new rural subdivisions in the interests of preserving 
river health. 
 
Environmental protection provisions must ultimately be incorporated into land use 
plans, and local councils have to apply them.  But the sensitivities involved in initiatives 
that threaten to undermine well-established traditions, dividing land and water 
management into separate fiefdoms, are clearly illustrated by a commitment by the 
agencies involved not to incorporate any environmental protection provisions into the 
first round of plans. 
 
 
                                               
143 Ibid, s 54(2). 
144 Ibid, 86(3). 
145 Ibid, ss 93(6), 94(3), 96(3), 102(6), 103(3), 105(2), 109(6), 110(3). 
146 K Bellette, “Legislation and Policy – One Sixth of the Equation for Integrated Water Resource 
Management,”  paper given to the 3rd Australasian Natural Resource Law and Policy Conference: Focus 
on Water, Adelaide, 22-23 March 2001; S Moseley and G Mavrinac, “Linking Land Use Planning and 
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147 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 38(3). 
148 See also Water Act 2000(Q), ss 258-259 which allow land use to be regulated in declared catchment 
areas so as to override the provisions of local land use planning schemes.  For the position in WA, see A 
Gardner,  “Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia – Implementing the CoAG Water Reforms,” 
(2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6-33 at 20. 
149 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 34. 
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Dealing With Scientific Uncertainty 
 
Scientific uncertainty frequently means that environmental impact is given less 
weight in decision-making processes than the more easily talked up socio-economic 
benefits of development.  Application of the precautionary principle represents one 
possible approach to scientific uncertainty, while adaptive management is another. 
 
The precautionary principle has been consistently identified in both policy 
documents and legislation in Australia as one of the core principles of ecologically 
sustainable development.150  It is especially relevant in the context of water resource 
management because of the particularly poor state of scientific knowledge about the 
water requirements of freshwater ecosystems.151  In this context, the environmental 
impact that we are particularly concerned with relates to the effects on ecosystems of 
inadequate or inappropriate flow regimes. 
 
Both the Queensland and NSW legislation specifically embrace the precautionary 
principle, defined in identical terms in both pieces of legislation: 
 
if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.152 
 
Defined in this way, the precautionary principle is a decision-making tool, which 
attempts to address the problem of scientific uncertainty by lowering the scientific burden 
of proof, so that environmental impact can command greater weight in decision-making 
processes rather than being dismissed for lack of scientific certainty.  In the context of 
river flows, it would mean that we cannot use the lack of incontrovertible scientific proof 
as a reason for delaying action to put in place ameliorative measures if we are satisfied 
that there is a “threat” of serious or irreversible damage to ecosystems from existing flow 
regimes.  
 
The South Australian legislation does not specifically refer to the precautionary 
principle but, in its objects section, talks in terms of reducing detrimental effects of water 
use and management “by requiring the use of caution and other safeguards”.153  One of 
the objects of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) is to “apply the principles of 
                                               
150 For a general discussion of the precautionary principle, see P Sands, Principles of International Law, 
Vol 1 (1995) at 208-213; C Burton, “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence 
in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine,” (1998) 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 509; D 
Farrier, “Factoring Biodiversity Conservation into Decision-Making Processes: The Role of the 
Precautionary Principle,” in R Harding and E Fisher, Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (1999). 
151 See, for example, ARMCANZ and ANZECC, National Principles for the Provision of Water for 
Ecosystems, Occasional Paper SWR No 3 (July 1996), Principle 8. 
152 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 4 and Dictionary (“principles of ecologically sustainable 
development”); Water Act 2000 (Q), s 11(b). 
153 Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 6(1)(b). 
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ecologically sustainable development”. 154  But the precautionary principle is not made 
clearly operational as one of the water management principles which decision-makers 
must “take all reasonable steps” to comply with and to “promote”. 
 
If the precautionary principle is to have any impact in practice, it must go beyond 
pure symbolism and do its work in the specific contexts of planning and licensing 
decisions.  For the principle is a methodology for determining what the impact on the 
environment is likely to be in a context where science is unable to offer any ready 
answers.  Only the Queensland legislation makes this specific connection between the 
precautionary principle and decision-making processes.  Here decision-makers are 
specifically required to advance “sustainable management and efficient use of water and 
other resources”.  Sustainable management must contribute to the economic development 
of the State “in accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development”, 
including the precautionary principle.155 
 
The argument is that where the precautionary principle does apply, those 
advocating measures to prevent environmental degradation, such as changes to river 
flows, only have to satisfy the threshold test of showing the existence of threats of 
serious or irreversible environmental damage, falling short of “full scientific certainty”.  
Once they have done this, decision-makers must assume that this impact is a reality, 
unless it can be shown that the threat does not in fact exist. 
 
The function, then, of the precautionary principle is to require the decision-maker, 
once the threshold test has been passed, to assume, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, that there is, or will be, serious or irreversible environmental damage (such as 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity) and to take this into account along 
with the full range of other factors which it must consider, even though there is a degree 
of scientific uncertainty about the extent of the impact.156 
 
The burden of proof effectively reverts to those advocating the status quo in 
relation to river flows, but only in relation to the nature and extent of environmental 
impact.  For there is nothing in this version of the precautionary principle which requires 
decision-makers to give overriding, primary, or even substantial weight to ecosystem 
requirements, as compared with other factors, when deciding how to proceed.  The 
                                               
154 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 3(a).  But note that there is no specific requirement in this 
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principle only addresses the narrow issue of scientific uncertainty.  The question of what 
weight should be given in decision-making processes to the assumed impact on the 
environment as against socio-economic considerations or the interests of existing 
consumptive users of water is a quite separate one.  It has been suggested above that 
under the NSW legislation, at least, ecosystem requirements for water must be given 
priority in planning processes relating to water sharing as against the interests of 
consumptive users.  This has nothing directly to do with the precautionary principle, 
although application of the principle may lead us to reach certain conclusions about what 
we should take those ecosystem requirements to be. 
 
In practice, the precautionary principle is likely to be seen as a radical doctrine, 
particularly where it is combined with prioritisation in favour of ecosystem requirements, 
as may be the case in NSW.  For many, the idea that we should act to reallocate water 
from consumptive use, with all of its socio-economic implications for particular water 
users and the broader public interest, without a clear scientific case being made for this 
will be counter-intuitive.  Another difficulty with the precautionary principle is that it 
fails to address situations of scientific ignorance about environmental impact.  It assumes 
the existence of some evidence of environmental impact.  An evidentiary burden or 
threshold test must  be satisfied by proof that there exist threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage before the burden of proof in relation to environmental impact is 
reversed. 
 
There are tensions in the Queensland legislation when it comes to these issues.  
The incorporation of the precautionary principle in the definition of the purposes of water 
resource planning and licensing sits uneasily with later references to “best scientific 
information available” when detailing planning processes.157  In particular, the Minister is 
instructed when preparing a draft water resource plan to consider, among other things, 
“the duration, frequency, size and timing of water flows necessary to support natural 
ecosystems as assessed using the best scientific information available”. 
 
References to decision-making on the “best scientific information available” are 
also found scattered throughout documents associated with the CoAG strategic 
framework, including the original Communique.158  The precautionary principle, on the 
other hand, barely rates a mention. 
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To the extent that the concept of “best scientific information available” implies 
that evidence must meet accepted canons of scientific proof, it conflicts with the 
application of the precautionary principle, and the Queensland legislation’s demand that 
decision-making powers be exercised in a way which contributes to economic 
development in accordance  with the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development.159  The point about the precautionary principle is that it allows evidence 
that does not meet canons of scientific proof to be taken into account. 
 
There is, however, another approach to precautionary decision-making in a 
context of scientific uncertainty.  Instead of attempting to create a false sense of certainty 
about environmental impact from the outset, as does the precautionary principle, this 
approach argues for adaptive management as new scientific knowledge becomes 
available. 
 
Knights, Fitzgerald and Denham160 have suggested a risk management approach 
to the question of environmental flows "which recognises that there is no scientifically 
correct solution but that some of the damage caused by river regulation and water 
abstraction can be minimised or redressed through a process of trial and adjustment".  
Decisions are not simply scientific ones, but contain a substantial value component.  
Consistent with the demand for intra-generational equity as one of the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development, social and economic considerations arising from 
disturbance of expectations will inevitably play a significant part in the initial 
readjustment of allocations to protect instream values.  But the flexibility to make 
adjustments in the future through a process of adaptive management based on ongoing 
monitoring and adjustment, is a crucial component of any package. 
 
The notion of adaptive management appears in a number of documents related to 
the CoAG strategic framework.161  While we have seen that the precautionary principle is 
not included as one of the water management principles established by the NSW 
legislation, adaptive management is: 
 
the principles of adaptive management should be applied, which should be 
responsive to monitoring and improvement in understanding of ecological 
water requirements.162 
 
                                               
159 Water Act 2000 (Q), ss 12, 10(2)(c)(ii). 
160 P Knights, B Fitzgerald and R Denham, “Environmental Flow Policy Development in NSW,”  
Proceedings of the National Agricultural and Resources Outlook Conference, Australian Bureau of 
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The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australian has recently approved 
putting in place an adaptive management regime as an appropriate approach to meeting 
the demands of the precautionary principle and achieving ecologically sustainable 
development in the context of a proposed tuna farm.163 
 
The National Competition Council has indicated that, in monitoring 
implementation of the strategic water resources framework by the States it will be 
looking at the extent to which water allocation plans allow for ongoing monitoring and 
adjustment in light of new information:164 
 
The techniques available for determining environmental water 
requirements cannot specify an environmental flow or regime that will 
conclusively ensure the protection of the environment.  Rather the 
techniques highlight the risks to ecological values of pursuing particular 
flow strategies.  Monitoring programs need to be established to ensure 
environmental water provisions are maintaining ecological values.  ……  
This will enable immediate remedial action to minimise risk of permanent 
degradation of ecological values. 
 
The Queensland, NSW and South Australian legislation all contain provisions for 
monitoring and review, but none of them contain clear commitments to finance the 
scientific research necessary to improve understanding of ecological flow 
requirements.165 
 
The use of adaptive management as a way of dealing with the issue of scientific 
uncertainty is an attractive one.  In practice, however, it is likely to jar with commitments 
to provide water users with “property rights”, which are strongly associated with 
demands for compensation where adjustments to water allocations are made. 
 
 
The Role of Compensation 
 
A strategy based on adaptive management clearly contemplates the possibility 
that water will be clawed back from consumptive users in certain circumstances and 
                                               
163 Tuna Boat Owners’ Association of SA Inc v Development Assessnent Commission [2000] 77 SASR 369. 




165 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 43(2), (3); Water Act 2000 (Q), ss 53-54; Water Resources Act 
1997 (SA), ss 92(3)(f)(iii), 101(4)(e)  
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reallocated to the environment, and this is specifically contemplated by some 
jurisdictions.166 
 
In NSW, Queensland and South Australia the position is that consumptive users 
are at no stage guaranteed that their access rights167 will not be interfered with by changes 
to the plan.  They have no security when it comes to the supply of water, reinforcing the 
priority that the NSW legislation, at least, gives to addressing ecosystem requirements.  
The Minister can vary the access regime established by the plan at any time.168  Water 
can in other words be clawed back to satisfy ecosystem needs that have become apparent 
as a result of further scientific research, and this will have a flow-on effect for individual 
water users.  If this does eventuate, then it raises the issue of whether users will be 
compensated. 
 
Even in the unlikely event that an argument that water licences amount to 
property could be sustained, there is nothing in the Constitutions of any of the States that 
provides compensation for “takings”.  There is such a clause in the Australian 
Constitution, but it only applies to the activities of the Commonwealth Government, not 
the State governments.169 
 
A policy position paper from a Task Force set up to advance the CoAG agenda 
left it to individual jurisdictions to determine whether compensation should be paid, but 
suggested that payment would be unlikely where reductions in entitlements stemmed 
from a full-scale review carried out within an open and consultative planning process.170  
The National Competition Council has emphasised the need for water rights to be “well 
specified in the long-term sense”, to ensure efficient water trade, use and investment.  It 
distinguishes arbitrary or non-transparent changes that alter the benefits provided (for 
example, a permanent expansion of water diversions that reduces security of supply) from 
transparent and consultative changes based on environmental justifications.  But it 
ultimately leaves the issue of compensation to the individual States.171 
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The argument is that where we are dealing with maintaining the essential health of 
river systems, the costs should be borne by existing users,172 who have in the past 
benefited from overcommitment of the resource.  Against this is the fact that water users 
have made investment decisions on the basis of the past practice of water management 
agencies.  They may have purchased an allocation only very recently. 
 
Neither NSW nor Queensland make provision for compensating water users for 
losses incurred as a result of the making of the first water plan for a catchment.173  
However, in both States, those licence-holders whose water allocations are reduced can 
claim compensation for changes which are made within the ten-year period following the 
making of the first plan.174  In Queensland, any change which reduces the value of an 
allocation is compensable, but in NSW compensation is only payable where a water 
allocation is reduced.175  This would seem to mean that compensation is not payable, for 
example, where changes are made to the timing of delivery. 
 
There is one exception in NSW to this requirement to pay compensation - where a 
mechanism allowing change is built into the plan itself.176  In practice, it is likely that 
such a mechanism will require a consensus decision of the water management committee 
before it is triggered, effectively giving water user representatives on the committee a 
right to veto uncompensated adjustments to water allocations during the ten year life of 
the plan. 
 
When a subsequent plan is made in NSW, after the expiry of the ten year life177 of 
the first, compensation is payable only if the Minister unilaterally departs from the final 
proposals of the water management committee,178 which, we have seen, must be based on 
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a consensus decision.  In Queensland there is no right to claim compensation for changes 
made more than ten years after approval of any particular plan.179 
 
The South Australian legislation takes a very different approach.  There is no 
provision for compensation where the Minister reduces water allocations to prevent 
damage or further damage to an ecosystem.180  However, a catchment water management 
board has a discretion to provide financial assistance to those who are detrimentally 
affected by the implementation of its plan.181 
 
The approach taken in South Australia raises the question of whether financial 
payments by government to water users should be delivered as incentives to make 
adjustments to their operations to cope with the shortfall in water, rather than 
compensation, a crucial distinction which is often lost in debates focused on property 
rights.  Compensation is backward looking and untargeted.  It is designed to alleviate the 
financial pain stemming from community interference with what has been classified as a 
property right, and to reassure the market that investment decisions will not be 
compromised by changes in government policy.  Financial support in the form of 
subsidies designed, for example, to improve water use efficiency or to enable storage of 
water, is both forward-looking and targeted. 
 
Traditionally Australian governments have been reluctant to use the discourse of 
compensation, but they have been quite comfortable with the idea of providing financial 
support for rural adjustment.  Where a subsidy results in improved water use efficiency, 
leaving more water in the stream, the community effectively gets a direct benefit from the 
subsidy, in the form of enhanced environmental flows.  On the other hand, subsidies will 
only cover part of the cost, so that water users are still being expected to make a 
contribution to the new flow regime.  Such an approach may well prove to be a 
satisfactory compromise between, on the one hand, leaving water users to bear the whole 
of the burden of a strategy of adaptive management, and, on the other, leaving the 





                                               
179 Water Act 2000(Q), s 986(b). 
180 Under Water Resources Act 1997 (SA), s 37. Cf s 146, where provision is made for compensation in 
other circumstances. 
181 Ibid, s 64(1)(b). 
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In its 1992 decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),183 the Australian High Court 
recognised the existence in Australia of native title under the common law.  In doing so, 
it reversed the earlier decision of a first instance judge in Milirrpum v Nabalco, which 
had stood for over 20 years.184 
 
Following Milirrpum, a number of “land rights” statutes were enacted, covering 
individual States and the Northern Territory. 185  While these resulted in the transfer of 
significant areas of land to indigenous communities in western areas of Australia, it was 
usually land unwanted for other purposes, much of it arid desert.  In the eastern states of 
Queensland, New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria the area involved was much smaller, 
by far the greater part of it in northern Queensland. 
 
In most instances, the beneficiaries of land rights legislation were those living on 
reserves and on land to which communities could show a continuing traditional 
connection, excluding those whose land had been alienated.  While in New South Wales, 
unlike most other jurisdictions, there were no such restrictions in the legislation, claims 
were nevertheless restricted to land not lawfully occupied or used, and not likely to be 
needed for a public purpose.  Title given to indigenous communities was generally 
“inalienable freehold”.  Apart from giving access to mining royalties, there was no real 
sense that the land rights initiative was part of an economic development strategy for 
indigenous communities to address social justice issues.  There was one significant 
exception to this.  Under the New South Wales legislation, 7.5% of land tax revenues for 
the years 1994-98 were allocated to the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, with 
half of this to be used for land purchases and the other half to be invested. 
 
The general assumption seems to be that this land rights legislation has little to 
say about indigenous access to water.186  This has only recently emerged as an issue with 
the recognition of native title in Mabo.  This paper will focus on the extent to which 
indigenous claims to gain access to water are likely to be recognised under the emerging 
law relating to native title, and the extent to which this will satisfy indigenous aspirations.  
This law is still in its infancy.   However there are already signs of a growing tension 
                                               
182 Thanks to my research assistants, Elisa Arcioni and Peta Glynn, 
183 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
184 (1971) 17 FLR 141. 
185 See, generally, on the land rights legislation, H McRae, G Nettheim and L Beacroft, Indigenous Legal 
Issues: Commentary and Materials (1997), chapter 4, which forms the basis of this discussion. 
186 It has recently been held that the reference to “land” in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) 
Act 1976 (Cth) does not include the sea bed of bays and gulfs: Risk v Northern Territory (2000) 180 ALR 
705. 
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between indigenous people’s desire to gain recognition for their traditional connections to 
the Australian landscape and the realisation that this will probably not allow them to 
participate in and benefit from the evolving water economy. 
 
 
Overview of Native Title in Australia 
 
While the Court in Mabo (No 2) did not disturb earlier findings that Australia was 
a settled rather than conquered territory, it concluded that, under the common law, native 
title is a “burden” on the radical title of the Crown which vested on the acquisition of 
sovereignty on settlement.  However, the content of native title reflects the traditional 
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the particular indigenous 
inhabitants claiming title: 
 
The content of native title, its nature and incidents will vary from one case 
to another.  It may comprise what are classified as personal or communal 
usufructuary rights involving access to the area of land in question to hunt 
for or gather food, or to perform traditional ceremonies.  This may leave 
room for others to use the land either concurrently or from time to time.  
At the opposite extreme, the degree of attachment to the land may be such 
as to approximate that which would flow from a legal or equitable estate 
therein.187 
 
Section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993, legislation enacted by the 
Commonwealth Parliament following the decision in Mabo, now provides: 
 
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, 
group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, 
and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, 
have a connection with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
 
Rights and interests are specifically defined to include hunting, gathering, and fishing 
rights and interests.188 
 
If the indigenous inhabitants lose their traditional connections to land, native title 
terminates.189  It may also be extinguished, without any possibility of revival, by valid 
                                               
187 The Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, at 169, per Gummow J. 
188 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223(2). 
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legislation or acts of the executive.  So, for example, while mere regulation of native title 
does not extinguish it,190 the grant by a State of a freehold estate in land does.191  Where 
native title is extinguished, the consent of the holders is not an issue, and no 
compensation is payable at common law. Extinguishment will usually have been at the 
hands of State governments because they have traditionally assumed responsibility over 
natural resource management.192 
 
While the nature of native title at common law was essentially confirmed by the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the law relating to the termination/suspension of native title 
rests on a complex interplay between common law and legislation.  One of the prime 
motivations for legislative intervention was the desire to protect existing non-indigenous 
interests in land, and even interests created subsequently to the decision in Mabo.  In this 
context, the perceived problem arose from the enactment of the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth), which provided that State legislation and executive acts which did not 
afford equal treatment before the law were inoperable to the extent of any 
inconsistency.193   The result was that, after 1975, legislation and actsthat might have 
been otherwise interpreted to extinguish native title, did not have this effect because they 
discriminated against indigenous interests.  The effect of non-compliance with the Racial 
Discrimination Act was the non-extinguishment and non-impairment of native title 
despite the inconsistent grant or legislation.194 
 
This led to Commonwealth195 and State196 legislation which validated past acts 
(those occurring before the end of 1993,197 in the case of Crown grants, or mid-1993 in 
the case of legislation),198 and future acts (legislation enacted on or after 1 July 1993, or 
                                                                                                                                            
189 This simple statement begs the question of when native title has effectively been abandoned, especially 
in circumstances where  the process of settlement has led to significant barriers being placed in the way of 
the observance of traditional customs.  See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of 
Victoria [2001] FCA 45, in which the Full Court of the Federal Court rejected the so-called “frozen in 
time” approach, holding  that dispossession does not inevitably lead to a community ceasing to 
acknowledge its traditional laws and observe its traditional customs, thereby losing its connection with the 
land. 
190 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 211 in fact negates the operation of certain laws requiring permits, etc for 
hunting, fishing, gathering and cultural or spiritual activity insofar as they impinge on the exercise of native 
title rights and interests, designed to satisfy personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs. 
191 Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 721. 
192 See the discussion of the relationship between the theoretical position under the Australian Constitution 
and actual practice in D Farrier, “Protecting Environmental Values in Water Resources in Australia,” paper 
delivered to this Conference. 
193 Racial Discrimination Act (Cth), s 10(1).  The Australian Constitution, section 109 provides that 
Commonwealth legislation that is within Commonwealth power overrides inconsistent State legislation.  
See Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
194 R H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (2000), at 309. 
195 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) Part 2, Division 2 and s 228.  
196 In NSW, see the Native Title (New South Wales) Act 1994, ss 8, 8A. 
197 The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) came into force on 1 January 1994. 
198 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 228. 
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other acts taking place on or after 1 January 1994).199  Although these provisions validate 
legislation and executive acts in spite of any failure to comply with the Racial 
Discrimination Act, they do not always restore their full extinguishing capacity.   In some 
cases, native title is simply suspended for the duration of an inconsistent interest rather 
than extinguished.  Compensation is generally provided. 
 
 
Native Title in Inland waters 
 
The definition of native title in section 223 of the Native Title Act 1993 makes it 
clear that native title can be claimed in both land and “waters”.  The latter is defined to 
include “sea, a river, a lake, a tidal inlet, a bay, an estuary, a harbour or subterranean 
waters” as well as the bed under waters and the airspace above.200 
 
Native title claims to inland waters could conceivably take a number of different 
forms: 
• landscape claims encompassing watercourses, stemming from their significance, 
along with floodplains and wetlands, as sources of food and medicines, and their 
importance in terms of cultural learning through dreaming stories and ceremonial 
rites; 
• claims to extract water for human consumption from traditional sources, such as rock 
wells, springs and soaks; 
• claims to extract water for cultural and spiritual purposes; 
• claims to extract water for commercial purposes (eg. irrigation); 
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse for subsistence purposes; 
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse because it contains items of 
Aboriginal cultural heritage or places of significance under Aboriginal laws, customs 
and beliefs; 
• claims to have a particular flow left in a watercourse for commercial purposes (eg. 
fisheries). 
 
Recent case law has confirmed native title rights to extract water for non-
commercial purposes in remote areas of Western Australia and the Northern Territory.  In 
                                               
199 Ibid, s 233.  There is also a category of “intermediate period acts”, comprising acts other than legislation 
that took place between1 January 1994 and 23 December 1996, the date of the High Court decision in Wik 
Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.  See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), Part 2, Division 2A.  
This validation category was particularly designed to address the Wik decision, which held that native title 
had not necessarily been extinguished on pastoral leases.  The justification for introducing the validation 
provisions was that governments might have done acts or made grants in relation to leasehold land without 
complying with the future act regime which then existed, on the assumption that native title had been 
extinguished.   See Commonwealth of Australia, Native Title: Legislation with Commentary by the 
Australian Government Solicitor (2nd ed, 1998), 21. 
200 Ibid, s 253. 
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Mark Anderson on behalf of the Spinifex People v State of Western Australia,201 the 
Federal Court confirmed an agreement between the parties which gave native title holders 
a right to take water for the purposes of satisfying their personal, domestic, social, 
cultural, religious, spiritual or non-commercial communal needs, including the 
observance of traditional laws and customs.  There were no rights to flowing or 
subterranean waters beyond this, and even the limited native title rights recognised were 
subject to interests granted under Western Australian water legislation. 
 
O’Donnell has argued that the issue of whether native title to inland waters 
includes the right to the exclusive possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of waters is 
the primary questionthat remains unresolved.202  In Commonwealth v Yarmirr, the High 
Court recently held that native title rights could extend to the sea and sea-bed within the 
territorial sea, but that they did not extend to a right to exclude others. 203 
 
Yet while the concept of exclusivity has meaning in the marine context, and could 
be extrapolated to a landscape claim incorporating a right to exclude others from a lake 
which has cultural significance, it has reduced purchase when it comes to the issue of 
rights to extract flowing water from rivers which traverse areas of land, only parts of 
which are subject to native title. In the Spinifex People’s case, it is significant that the 
court restricted to land the right to confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment to 
the exclusion of all others, which it recognised in relation to part of the claim.204 
 
When it comes to water extraction, the relevant issue is about priority of access to 
flows at times of water shortage.  In the Spinifex People’s case, it was made clear that, 
where there was a conflict, licensed rights to access water under legislation prevailed 
over even the minimal native title rights to use water outlined above.  This approach has 
been repeated in other cases.  In Ngalpil v State of Western Australia,205 the Federal 
Court approved another agreement which proclaimed the right of the native title 
claimants “to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the land and waters of the Determination 
Area to the exclusion of all others”, and to control access to and activities on both land 
and waters.  But it then went on to make it clear that native title rights in relation to 
flowing and subterranean waters only extended to those which “exist at law” and, in the 
event of inconsistency, rights granted to others under water legislation prevail over them, 
without extinguishing them.206  
 
                                               
201 [2000] FCA 1717. 
202 M O’Donnell, “Briefing Paper for the Water Rights Project by the Lingiari Foundation and ATSIC” in 
Background Briefing Papers (February 2002), 95-105, at 97, available at www.atsic.gov.au (Issues). 
203 [2001] HCA 56.  The first instance finding that native title rights to fish, hunt and gather did not extend 
to commercial purposes went unchallenged. 
204 Even in relation to land, there were a number of significant exceptions that would seem to make the 
recognition of the right to exclude largely symbolic. 
205 [2001] FCA 1140. 
206 See also Hayes v Northern Territory [2000] FCA 671; State of Western Australia v Ward [2000] FCA 
611. 
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In Wandarang, Alawa, Marra and Ngalakan Peoples v Northern Territory of 
Australia, after the applicants had dropped their claim to exclusive rights to the waters of 
several rivers, confining it to river beds and banks, Olney J simply stated that “the 
common law does not recognise a claim to ownership of flowing water”.207 At common 
law, flowing water was regarded as publici juris, incapable of giving rise to property 
rights, although riparian landholders had limited rights of access, possession and use.208 
 
Combine the low priority given to indigenous rights to extract water with the 
current assumption that historically, traditional practices of Aboriginal communities did 
not incorporate irrigation,209 and it is going to prove difficult for indigenous communities 
to claim access to and control over substantial quantities of water.  It is true that the 
courts have made it clear that they will not adopt an approach to native title, which 
requires today’s applicants to show that they claim rights under laws acknowledged or 
customs observed that are either identical, or very similar, to the laws acknowledged and 
customs observed by their ancestors at the time that sovereignty was acquired by the 
Crown (characterised as the “frozen in time” approach).  They will recognise the 
evolution of native title as relationships between indigenous communities and their land 
change.210  But there are clearly limits to how far they will be prepared to go.  Laws and 
customs lose their traditional quality “if they reflect a breaking with the past rather than 
the maintenance of the ways of the past in changed circumstances”.211  A majority of the 
Full Court of the Federal Court in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v 
State of Victoria was prepared to accept that a right to enter on land to hunt would 
survive a change in prey from native animals to rabbits as the supply of the former 
diminished.  But it left open the question of whether a right to enter land only during a 
particular season to gather a particular bush fruit could evolve into a native title right, 
once the bush fruit had become extinct, to enter the land at a later season to gather an 
alternative food source.212  In this context, it would be a significant leap to suggest that 
use of water for broadacre irrigation represents only an evolution in the nature and 
incidents of native title rather than a substantial break with a past which may, depending 
on the evidence, have seen water extracted only for subsistence, cultural and spiritual 
purposes. 
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Recognition that native title claims are only likely to result in access to small 
quantities of water for very limited purposes perhaps underlies an increasing focus by 
indigenous interests on mounting political rather than legal claims to commercial 
quantities of water based on social justice arguments.213  This will be considered further 
below.  However, a potential basis for native title rights which appears not to have been 
explored so far, other than in the context of broad claims to exclusive rights, deserves 
more attention.  This rests on claims, not to extract water, but to have flows left instream.  
One objective would be to protect traditional practices involving the hunting and 
gathering of animals, fish and plants living in, or close to watercourses, not only for 
subsistence purposes but also because of their ceremonial and spiritual significance.  
Beyond this, high levels of extraction may have significant impacts on the cultural or 
spiritual significance of particular stretches of water to indigenous communities.  The 
water may be significant in its own terms or because it contributes to the general health of 
a locality.214  There are obvious overlaps here with demands by conservation interests for 
environmental flows.  While acknowledging this, indigenous communities would argue 
that their claims have quite distinct aspects.  If successful, claims to have water left 
instream could have a significant impact in terms of reducing the security of supply for 
commercial extractors, and, therefore, provide indigenous interests with a powerful 
bargaining tool when it comes to inducing irrigators and State governments to enter into 
Indigenous Land Use Agreements.  In these agreements, indigenous interests can agree to 
extinguish native title by surrendering it to government, in return for other benefits.215 
 
 
Extinguishment of Native Title to Water 
 
The law relating to extinguishment of native title is cloudy, and awaits the 
imminent decision of the High Court on appeal in the case of Western Australia v 
Ward.216  What is at least clear is that native title can be extinguished not only by 
legislation, but also by executive acts carried out under legislation, such as the issue of 
water licences. 
 
One possibility is that the early water legislation enacted by the States showed a 
“clear and manifest intention” to extinguish native title.  A provision found in that 
                                               
213 See Submission by NSW Aboriginal Land Council on the Interim State Water Management Outcomes 
Plan (February 2002). 
214 See New South Wales Land Council, Securing Our Water Future (June 2000); Sarah Yu, Ngapa 
Kunangkul: Living Water, Report on the Aboriginal Cultural Values of Groundwater in the La Grange 
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legislation, in the case of NSW since before the turn of the century,217 vested the 
exclusive right to the use, flow and control of waters in particular States.  In Western 
Australia v Ward, the Full Court held that this provision in the Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) did not show an intention to extinguish native title rights.218  
The Court went on to consider whether the Western Australian legislation extinguished 
native title in the course of abolishing all existing rights to take and use water, and 
replacing them with statutory rights (which did not recognise native title).  It concluded 
that the legislation did not in fact replace existing rights to use water.  However, the 
majority held that the legislation did operate to destroy any exclusive rights to control the 
use and enjoyment of waterthat the native title claimants could otherwise show.219 
 
In some other States, particularly NSW, the argument that the early water 
legislation replaced existing rights with statutory rights will be more difficult to resist, 
although there has been a vigorous debate about whether the legislation managed to 
destroy all riparian rights which previously existed at common law.220  Bartlett221 has 
argued that the NSW legislation does not extinguish native title: 
 
[P]rovision was made for special redefined rights for [riparian] owners 
indicating that it was not intended to expropriate rights to water without 
compensation or consideration.  It is not expropriative legislation.  
Moreover, the prohibition of diversions and the taking of water without a 
licence are inappropriate to the restriction of native title rights to water for 
traditional purposes.  Achievement of the objects of the legislative scheme 
does not necessitate the general extinguishment of native title to water. 
 
As we will see below, the most recent NSW legislation assumes that native title 
rights have not been extinguished but continue to exist, at least where they are limited to 
“non-exclusive rights to take and use water for personal, domestic, and non-commercial 
communal purposes”.222 
 
                                               
217 Water Rights Act 1896 (NSW). The Irrigation Act 1886 (Vic)simply vested in the State the right to use 
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If native title has not been extinguished by legislation, there remains the question 
of whether it has been extinguished by the issue of water licences.  While it did not 
address the specific impact of water licensing, the 2-1 majority decision of the Full Court 
of the Federal Court in Ward is relevant, but quite unsatisfactory.223  The majority 
appears to conclude that executive acts, such as granting a water licence, which create 
rights in third parties inconsistent with a continued right to enjoy native title, extinguish it 
to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that there is a “clear and plain intention” to do 
so.  But this intention does not have to be manifested in the authorising legislation.  It can 
appear from the action taken by the executive.224  After reviewing the case law, Bartlett 
argues that while such an intention is required, the reference is not to actual intention, but 
to that “objectively manifested”.225 
 
This raises the question, then, of what the requirement for proof of a “clear and 
plain intention” adds to the requirement for inconsistency.  One answer is perhaps 
supplied by North J, the dissenting judge in Ward, who argues that not all inconsistent 
acts extinguish native title: 
 
A minor or insignificant inconsistency between the rights or interests 
created and native title could not lead to such a far-reaching consequence 
as total abrogation of native title.  There must be proportionality between 
the impact of the law or the act and the effect on native title.  Only a law 
or act which has the effect of totally replacing native title by completely 
nullifying it will result in extinguishment of native title.  The 
inconsistency with the law or act must be total, fundamental or absolute to 
effect extinguishment.226 
 
In situations falling short of this, where rights under native title conflict with those 
exercisable under the grant, they must give way, or they are suspended.227  But in these 
circumstances, native title is not extinguished. 
 
The majority in Ward gets around having to say that even minor inconsistencies 
extinguish native title by arguing that native title is a bundle of rights, and to the extent to 
which particular rights are inconsistent with rights conferred under an executive act, 
native title is partially extinguished.228 
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Yet before we get to the question of whether there is a “clear and plain intention” 
to extinguish native title, we must first find an inconsistency between its incidents and 
those stemming from the executive grant - specifically in the present context, the issue of 
water licences.  Much here will, of course depend on the precise contents of the native 
title claimed.  But as a general proposition, it would seem difficult to argue that water 
licences would extinguish native title where this involved extraction of water by 
Aboriginal people. Licences in the Australian States have traditionally not guaranteed 
access to a particular quantity of water.  Nor do they follow the prior appropriation 
doctrine in giving priority of access to water based on historical usage.  In times of 
shortage, the pain is generally shared, with limited exceptions.   Licences had to be 
renewed periodically, and they could be suspended or modified for a range of reasons.  
While, as the majority in Ward concluded in relation to the Western Australian 
legislation, the legislation’s restrictions on access would undermine any native title 
argument for exclusive access, it hardly suggests complete extinguishment. 
 
Native title embodying rights to have water left in the stream for fishing and 
cultural purposes may raise different issues.  Yet while there was nothing in the early 
water legislation which guaranteed instream flows, there was equally nothing which 
guaranteed to licence holders that they would be able to drain the stream dry.  The basic 
point is that the system of water allocation was riven with discretion.  To this extent, 
there were no rights under water licences, in spite of the folklorethat existed among 
irrigators.   It is clear that water could be clawed back to restore instream ecosystems.  
Native title claims to have more water left in the stream must be viewed in this context. 
 
 
Validity of Past Acts 
 
The general position is that insofar as any “past acts”, such as water legislation or 
the grant of water licences, are invalid,229 they have been validated by legislation.230 The 
salient source of potential invalidity is the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), with its 
demands for equal treatment under the law.  But the legislation has been drafted broadly 
enough to cover any other sources of invalidity, including those occurring before 1975.  
The operating assumption, however, is that, at least prior to 1975, native title in many 
contexts was extinguished by valid acts which do not need any assistance from the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth).  In this case no compensation is payable. 
 
Invalid past acts attributable to the States have been validated by State legislation, 
at the invitation of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).231  This would cover water resources 
legislation232 enacted before mid-1993 and water licences issued before the end of 1993 
                                               
229 Commonwealth of Australia, Native Title: Legislation with Commentary by the Australian Government 
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230 Native Title Act 1993(Cth), Part 2, Division 2. 
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where they operated in a discriminatory manner.  Out of abundant caution, the 
Commonwealth legislation also allowed the States to enact legislation confirming any 
existing right of the Crown “to use, control and regulate the flow of water”.233 
 
Insofar as they need to be validated, water legislation and water licences are 
categorised as category D past acts.234  The result is that native title is not extinguished.  
Under the so-called “non-extinguishment principle”, it continues to exist, but to the 
extent of any inconsistency or partial inconsistency between native title rights and the act, 
the native title rights are suspended (for example, until a water licence terminates).235  
Compensation is payable in certain circumstances, but it is unclear how this applies in a 
water context.236 
 
Where water licences issued before the end of 1993 are renewed, the renewals 
will be treated as valid past acts, provided that they only “permit activities of a similar 
kind to those permitted by the earlier act”.237  However, if the licence is expanded into a 
“proprietary interest”, this validating provision does not operate.238  This is likely to pose 
a significant problem in the context of current initiatives by the States, at the instigation 
of the Commonwealth, to convert what have historically been water licences into some 
sort of “property” interest.239 
 
 
Recent Initiatives in State Water Management Legislation 
 
New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia have all enacted water 
management legislation in the last five years.  There is nothing in the Water Resources 
Act 1997 (SA) which specifically adverts to indigenous interests, although there is a 
general reference in the objects of the Act to resource management which sustains the 
physical, economic and social well being of the people of the State, and the need to 
encourage community participation in water resource management.  There is no 
guarantee of Aboriginal representation on the Water Resources Council, responsible for 
keeping the State Water Plan under review,240 or catchment water management boards,241 
or water resources planning committees.242   The 2000 version of the State Water Plan243 
                                               
233 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 212(1). See, for example, Native Title (New South Wales) Act 1994, s 
17(2).  The mere act of confirming these rights did not extinguish native title: NTA s 212(3). 
234 Ibid, s 232. See R H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (2000), at paras 23.7-23.8. 
235 Ibid, s 238. 
236 Ibid, s 17(2)(c), referring to the “similar compensable interest” test.  In essence, this asks whether 
compensation would be payable to someone with an “ordinary interest” (NTA s 240), for example, a fee 
simple in relation to land (NTA s 253).  But the concept of “ordinary title” in relation to water is undefined.  
237 Ibid, s 228(4). 
238 Ibid, s 228(6), (7). 
239 See, for example the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), discussed below. 
240 Water Resources Act 1997, ss 50-51. 
241 Ibid, ss 58-59. 
242 Ibid, s 83. 
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makes no reference to indigenous interests in water, and no special arrangements were 
made for consulting with Aboriginal people in the development of the Plan.244 
 
In contrast to this position in South Australia,245 the legislation in Queensland, 
and particularly in NSW, contains specific references to indigenous interests in water.  So 
far as its impact on native title is concerned, the timing of this legislation places it in the 
category of “future acts”, with the consequence that any failure to comply with the 
provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act will only be validated in accordance with the 
future act provisions of the Native Title Act 1993.  The particular implications of this will 
be considered after the relevant provisions of the legislation have been analysed. 
 
 
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) 
 
One of the fundamental changes in perspective confirmed by the Water 
Management Act is the separation of the historical connection between occupancy of land 
and access to water.  This significantly disadvantaged indigenous communities when it 
came to gaining access to significant quantities of water under licence, insofar as they did 
not have rights to occupy land.  This connection between occupation of land and access 
to water is broken by the new legislation. In theory, anybody can apply for an access 
licence,246 entitling them to a share of the available water in a water management area 
(“share component”), and a right to take water at specified times/rates/circumstances 
from specified locations (“extraction component”).247  But licences can only be granted 
where this is permitted under the applicable water management plan,248 and these plans 
will confirm existing, or impose fresh, licence embargoes on waterbodies in most areas of 
the State.249  The result is that new licences to extract water in these areas cannot be 
granted but will have to be purchased in the market place.250  Existing rights to access 
water will be “grandfathered”, and indigenous disadvantage perpetuated, subject to token 
                                                                                                                                            
243 Available at www.dwr.sa.gov.au/publications/waterplan.html 
244 Personal correspondence with Ania Karzek, Policy Officer, State Policy Branch, Department of Water 
Resources (SA), 14 December 2001. 
245 Similarly, there is nothing in the much older Water Act 1989 (Vic) which specifically adverts to 
indigenous interests, although the purposes of the legislation include promoting  “the orderly, equitable and 
efficient use of water resources”, and making sure that “water resources are conserved and properly 
managed for sustainable use for the benefit of present and future Victorians”: s1(c),(d).  An Indigenous 
Partnership Strategy has been developed, but makes no commitment in relation to indigenous interests in 
water.  The only commitment is to develop an Aboriginal Participation in Land and Resource Management 
(APLRM) strategy that “integrates the involvement of Indigenous communities in land, resource and 
cultural heritage management” (Department of Natural Resources and Environment (2001), p 14).  
Indigenous interests are to be reflected in indigenous contributions to management by the State rather than 
through rights of access to water. 
246 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 61(1). 
247 Ibid, s 56(1). 
248 Ibid, s 63(2)(b). 
249 Ibid, ss 80-82. 
250 Ibid, Chapter 3, Part 2, Division 4. 
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exceptions.   For example, the draft Kangaroo River water management plan exempts 
“Aboriginal cultural licences”, subject to a volume limit of 12 megalitres in total.251 
 
Yet one of the proclaimed objects of the Act is to recognise and foster “benefits to 
the Aboriginal people in relation to their spiritual, social, customary and economic use of 
land and water” resulting from the sustainable and efficient use of water.252  The 
significant point here is the recognition of an Aboriginal commercial interest in water.  
But there is nothing in the Actthat requires water to be set aside to provide for this.  The 
reference to indigenous interests in the water management principles instituted by the Act 
is restricted to a commitment to protect “geographical and other features of indigenous 
significance”.253  There is no reference here to Aboriginal commercial interests in water.  
This is significant.  For while a general duty is placed on all those exercising functions 
under the Act to take all reasonable steps to do so in accordance with the water 
management principles, and to promote them,254 the objects of the Act can only be made 
operational through provisions in water management plans,255 and these are not 
mandatory. 
 
In practice the issue of Aboriginal commercial interests in water has not been 
addressed in draft water sharing plans so far completed.  While water management 
committees must include at least two Aboriginal representatives,256 there have been 
significant barriers to effective indigenous participation in committees stemming from 
fundamental cultural constraints.   There is nothing else in the legislation itselfthat 
indicates how the Act’s object of fostering Aboriginal economic benefits from water use 
will be achieved. The rhetoric may be strong, but the legislation is weak when it comes to 
delivering concrete benefits. 
 
The legislation does, however, recognise non-commercial indigenous interests in 
water.  Water sharing plans are required to identify water requirements to satisfy “basic 
landholder rights”,257 and these include “native title rights”.   Basic landholder rights are 
rights to take water without a licence for limited purposes.258  Native title rights are 
defined259 as: 
 
non-exclusive rights to take and use water for personal, domestic, and 
non-commercial communal purposes (including the purposes of drinking, 
food preparation, washing, manufacturing traditional artefacts, watering 
                                               
251 Draft Water Sharing Plan for the Kangaroo River Water Source (2002), cll 37-39. 
252 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 3(c)(iv): emphasis supplied. 
253 Ibid, s 5(2)(e). 
254 Ibid, s 9(1)(a). 
255 Ibid, s 21(e). 
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domestic gardens, hunting, fishing and gathering and recreation, cultural 
and ceremonial purposes). 
 
Apart from the fact that commercial use, such as fish farming, is 
excluded, there are a number of restrictions placed on native title rights.  In the 
first place, they only allow holders to “take and use” water, which implies that 
they can only extract it, and not insist that it be left within the stream to 
facilitate instream uses such as ecosystem protection for fishing or cultural 
purposes.  Secondly, while the provisions authorise a pump, they do not 
authorise the construction of a dam or water bore unless a separate approval is 
secured.260  Finally, they are only exercisable by those who have actually been 
granted native title rights in relation to the waters in question under the Native 
Title Act 1993.  This undermines the provision in the legislation that requires 
water sharing plans to give priority to the provision of water for basic 
landholder rights before allocating it to other consumptive purposes.261 
 
In practice, draft water sharing plans currently on exhibition do contain 
an estimate of water required for basic landholder rights, while recognising that 
these rights may increase during the life of the plan.  This would appear to 
mean that plans would have to be amended to provide for any increase, given 
the prioritythat the legislation gives to basic landholder rights.  The general 
position is that compensation will have to be paid to those whose water 
allocations are reduced within the ten-year life of the plan, unless the plan itself 
provides for amendment in specified circumstances.262     
 
 
Water Act 2000 (Queensland) 
 
Chapter 2 of the Queensland legislation sets up systems for licensing the 
allocation of water and provides for the development of water resource plans.  Its purpose 
is to “advance the sustainable management and efficient use of water and other resources 
by establishing a system for the planning, allocation and use of water”.263   
 
The primary feature of sustainable management is that it is management which: 
(a) allows for the allocation and use of water for the physical, economic and 
social well being of the people of Queensland and Australia within limits that 
can be sustained indefinitely; and 
(b) protects the biological diversity and health of natural ecosystems. 
 
                                               
260 Ibid, s 55(2)(a). 
261 Ibid, ss 5(3)(b), 9(1)(b). 
262 Ibid, ss 87, 42(2). 
263 Water Act 2000 (Q), s 10(1). 
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A range of other factors is identified as matters to which such management 
“contributes”.  This includes “recognising the interests of Aboriginal people and Torres 
Strait Islanders and their connection with the landscape in water planning”.264  
 
Planning and licensing functions must be carried out in a way that advances the 
chapter’s purpose.265  It is unclear how much of a contribution water managers must 
make to recognising indigenous interests, but it is at least clear that their decisions must 
lead to some contribution if they are to comply with this duty.  The reference is broad 
enough to include indigenous economic interests.  This is supported by more general 
references.  For example, other matters to which sustainable management is identified as 
contributing include “providing for the fair, orderly and efficient allocation of water to 
meet community needs”,266 and “the economic development of Queensland in accordance 
with the principles of ecologically sustainable development”.267   One of the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development is that “decision-making processes should 
effectively integrate both long-term and short-term economic, environmental, social and 
equitable considerations”.268 
 
Unlike NSW, where some attempt has been made to provide for the likely 
existence of native title rights in the legislation itself, in Queensland indigenous issues are 
addressed in water resource plans.  There is no overarching policy position beyond the 
broad provisions of the legislation and a commitment to consultation with indigenous 
stakeholders.269 
 
Water resource plans are prepared by the responsible government agency on 
behalf of the Minister.270  In preparing a draft, the Minister is required to consider 
“cultural, economic and social values”, and “the State’s future water requirements, 
including cultural, economic, environmental and social requirements”.271  Community 
input is through a community reference panel and public exhibition of the draft plan.272  
There is a general provision that panels must include representatives of cultural, 
economic and environmental interests in the relevant area,273 but no specific reference to 
indigenous interests.  
 
In practice, an Indigenous Working Group is created in consultation with the 
Land Council in each planning area, to facilitate consultation with indigenous 
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communities.  The Department in consultation with this group produces a technical 
report.  Two members of the group are then “usually” chosen as members of the statutory 
community reference panel.274 
 
In water resource plans made so far, the general approach has been to see 
indigenous interests in cultural rather than economic terms, as managers of instream 
values, closely aligned with environmental interests, rather than water extractors. 
Indigenous interests are conceptualised as a constraint on allocation decisions.  The 
Fitzroy Basin Plan has as one of its principles  that “[d]ecisions shall be made with full 
recognition of cultural and indigenous issues”.275  Other assessment criteria in the plan 
include minimising “impacts on local indigenous cultural values associated with 
streamflows”.276  In preparing a resource operations plan or making decisions on water 
allocations, one of the factors to be considered is “the impacts on local indigenous 
cultural values associated with streamflows”.277 
 
One of the significant features of the Burnett Basin WAMP Indigenous Cultural 
Report is that river flows are only one of a wide range of issues about which indigenous 
communities are concerned.  Others include riparian zone protection and water pollution.  
Indigenous communities do not divide the environment up into segments as resource 
management agencies continue to strive to do.278  
 
 
Native Title and Water Management Legislation 
 
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)provides machinery to allow acts impacting on 
native title to be done after the decision in Mabo.  If a future act does not fall within a 
category that is allowed under the future act regime, it is automatically invalid to the 
extent that it affects native title, regardless of whether it offends against the Racial 
Discrimination Act.279 
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Section 24 HA of the Native Title Act deals with the situation where there is a 
conflict between water management legislation which is a “future act”, and native title.  
Both the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), and the Water Act 2000 (Q), are 
categorised as “future acts” because they were enacted after 1 July 1993. 
 
Suppose, for example, that the provision for native title basic landholder rights in 
the NSW legislation is eventually found not to go far enough because it fails to recognise 
native title rights to have water left in the stream, or, less likely, because it fails to 
provide for native title rights to use water commercially.  The Native Title Act provides 
that in specified circumstances water management legislation will nevertheless be valid.  
Even where the legislation is valid, however, native title will not be extinguished, but 
suspended to the extent of the inconsistency or partial inconsistency.280  Compensation is 
payable.281 Similarly, licences issued after 1 January 1994 under water management 
legislation will also be valid, with the same consequences.282  Indigenous interests must 
first be given a chance to comment on proposed licences.283 
 
These validating provisions, however, only cover legislation relating to the 
“management or regulation” of water and living aquatic resources.  This includes 
“granting access to water, or taking water”.  There is an argument that the NSW 
legislation goes further than this in that it significantly enhances the security of licence 
holders in response to their demands for “property rights”.  The general position is that, 
during the ten-year life of a water management plan, licence holders can claim 
compensation for any reduction in their water allocations resulting from an adjustment in 
the amount of water available for extraction.284  The legislation also allows licences to be 
transferred.285  In these circumstances, the argument would be that the legislation goes 
beyond water management and regulation, by securing in the hands of historically 
privileged licence holders commercially exploitable rights.  This would mean that the 
legislation would be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency with native title rights, and 
the latter would prevail.  Similarly, the argument would be that renewals of water 
licences under the Water Management Act286 could not be treated as validated extensions 
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of “past acts”287 or renewals of future acts288 because they create a “proprietary interest” 
in relation to waters.289 
 
The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that any conflicting native title 
rights declared by the courts could, presumably, be satisfied by clawing back water from 
licence holders through amendments to water management plans, and paying licence 
holders compensation.  This would remove the inconsistency.  In the end, the issue 
appears to be very much about whom the State government decides to compensate: native 
titleholders or water licensees.  Given that compensation will allow either indigenous 
interests or water licence holders to enter the transfer market to purchase water licences, 
and that water available under these licences can be either extracted for commercial or 
cultural purposes or committed to instream environmental purposes,290 the issue may be 
largely academic.  But this will not be the case where transfer rules prevent the transfer of 
licences into a particular water source (for example, because it is environmentally 





Australian experience in dealing with the issue of indigenous interests in water 
would, at present, appear to offer few, if any, positive lessons to other jurisdictions.  
Although the issue has only come to a head very recently, with the recognition of the 
existence of common law native title rights in the early 1990’s, the signs are not 
promising when it comes to recognition of indigenous interests. 
 
Aboriginal communities, particularly those in less remote areas, face massive 
difficulties in proving that they have maintained their connections with land by 
continuing to acknowledge their traditional laws and observe their traditional customs.  
Native title may simply have expired.291  Alternatively, it may have been extinguished by 
legislation, or more likely, executive grant.  If this occurred before 1975, as much of it 
certainly did, it does not attract the payment of compensation regardless of whether the 
legislation or acts involved discriminated against indigenous communities.  Even after 
1975, discriminatory acts impacting on native title have been legitimated through the 
legislative process, albeit they now attract compensation.  Even future acts can, in certain 
circumstances, override native title rights. 
 
In those circumstances where native title nevertheless continues to survive, the 
general approach of the courts has been to provide that rights granted to the colonising 
community under legislation prevail over it if there is any inconsistency.  Whether we 
                                               
287 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 228. 
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refer to this as “partial extinguishment” or maintain what, in the water context, would 
seem to be largely a fiction that native title survives but has in part been suspended or 
must give way, seems to be essentially about symbolism. 
 
Whatever the discourse, giving priority to rights granted under legislation has 
very significant implications for indigenous interests when it comes to the extraction of 
water from watercourses.  It means that, in times of water shortage, licensed irrigators 
will even take precedence over native title rights to extract water for limited subsistence  
purposes, except in those States, such as South Australia, which do not limit unlicensed 
access to riparian occupiers, but allow anybody who has “lawful access to a watercourse” 
to extract water.292 
 
In New South Wales, the Murray-Darling Basin State which, on the face of the 
legislation, has gone furthest in terms of recognition of indigenous interests in water, the 
harsh reality is very different when it comes to offering any guarantees.  Opportunities 
for indigenous communities to apply for licences to take water have been foreclosed by 
the emplacement of embargoes, albeit for the very good reason that most watercourses 
are either fully committed or overcommitted.  At the same time, while indigenous 
demands for “property rights” have been denied through the discourse of non-exclusive 
native title, the equivalent demands of irrigators have been largely met.  Those who hold 
licences have now had their rights under these “grandfathered” and significantly 
expanded.  They have been given greater security that the amounts of water they can 
access will not be diminished without compensation, and they can sell their rights in the 
market place.  These changes have emerged from the process of water reform generated 
by the 1994 Council of Australian Government’s strategic framework for an “efficient 
and sustainable water industry”, with its commitments to clear specification of 
transferable property rights and provision of water for the environment.293  There was no 
acknowledgment of indigenous interests in water.  In these circumstances, the only hope 
of indigenous communities is that the legislation may be declared invalid, as going 
beyond the limits of permissible future acts. 
 
It is scarcely surprising that, in this climate, indigenous people, in their quest to 
gain access to water, are looking beyond common law rights, and the meagre offerings in 
legislation.  Their arguments rest not on their rights under domestic law, but on broader 
claims related to human rights, social justice and the need for economic development, 
based in part on Australia’s obligations under international conventions, such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity. 
 
In New South Wales, they are on the verge of achieving a small but significant 
victory.  The State Water Management Outcomes Plan, made under the Water 
Management Act 2000 is designed to “set the over-arching policy context, targets and 
strategic outcomes for the management of the State’s water sources”.294  The current draft 
of the Plan recognises that the significance of water to indigenous communities is not 
confined to cultural practices and subsistence but includes economic development.  It 
contains a commitment, as a “long-term outcome”, that “Aboriginal traditional and 
contemporary dependencies on, and cultural association with water” is to be “protected 
and improved”.  As part of this, economic access to water is to be increased.  This stems 
from an acknowledgment that traditional forms of access to water are no longer available 
to communities and must be replaced with forms “appropriate to contemporary 
Aboriginal life”.295  A five year target is to put mechanisms in place to enable Aboriginal 
communities to gain “an increased share of the benefits of the water economy”, including 
developing contemporary industries.296   At present, details of how this is to be achieved 
are few.  There is a reference to providing access to unallocated water but this is 
acknowledged to be available only in very limited areas.  More significantly, however, 
access to the water market is also mentioned.  This would, presumably, involve 
government in providing funds to purchase water.  In this context, Aboriginal interests 
are currently arguing for the establishment of an Aboriginal Trust which would hold 
Aboriginal rights in water sources. 
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